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PATHWAYS TO THE RADICALISATION OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS IN INDIA – *Phase 1*

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SUMMARY OF PRESENT REPORT

Various explanations of terrorism have been offered relating to social conditions, grievances and geopolitical processes. However, because of the difficulty of direct contact with terrorists there have been few explorations that deal directly with the understanding and experiences of individuals who have been involved in acts of violence. In particular, there has been no published study of interviews with *jihadi* terrorists in India, despite the significance of such individuals in relation to current major concerns about terrorism.

Therefore, in order to develop an in-depth appreciation of the psychological processes involved in people becoming active in *jihadi* violence the qualitative analysis of interviews with 49 convicted Islamic terrorists in India is summarized. The interviews were conducted in Hindi or Urdu and translated into English for analysis. Background information on the respondents, the organizations to which they belonged, and their attacks were also collected.

In addition a detailed case study is reported of the lone terrorist survivor of the Mumbai attack on 26 November 2008 in which 173 people were killed.


The main characteristics of those interviewed were as follows:

- The *jihadis* interviewed had been involved in a wide range of attacks across India.
- They were all Moslem, but although the majority were Pakistani, about one third were Indian.
- They all expressed some religious commitment although this was to different degrees.
- All cite atrocities and other acts that they see as politically based abuse of other Moslems.
- They come from a variety of backgrounds, although typically from poor working class settings.
- There were a mixture of educational achievements amongst those interviewed, although virtually all were literate and had attended school up to the age of 14 at least.
- They had usually become involved in militant activity in their teens, although it was not uncommon for them to be caught up in related activity when they were younger.

The implications of the responses and characteristics of respondents for the general understanding of terrorism are:

- Support for the view that terrorists do not come out of especially deprived situations.
- They are neither typically well-educated, nor uneducated, but cover a range of intelligence and education.
- The role of religious beliefs is varied. Certainly many are not driven by what has been called a 'clash of ideologies', but rather by a feeling they need to fight against attacks on co-religionists.
- Some of the respondents are willing to give up violent means to achieve their goals. They are not all implacably committed to *jihad*.

The main pathways into terrorism can be summarised as follows:



These pathways recognise four dominant processes:

1. The Zealot who, as a religious fundamentalist wishes to follow a radical interpretation of the Quran to bring back the caliphate.
2. The Warrior, who wishes to take up arms to right the wrongs he has seen and defend his brothers and sisters.
3. The political intellectual, who sees violent attacks as a way to change the status quo.
4. The victim, who claims to be unaware of any of these processes but just found his way unthinkingly into violent aggression. However, even these individuals will have contact with militants through friends or family, although possibly unwittingly.

Some further pointers emerged from the interviews:

- All the conscious actions are based on simple clear identification with a Moslem community as opposed to those who are not Moslem.
- Any political acts of aggression against particular Moslem individuals or symbols of Islam are taken as an attack on all Moslems.
- The overlap with organised crime is considerable, but often hidden behind the rhetoric of *jihad*.

The crucial point that the research reveals is that the terrorist ‘propaganda of the deed’ in which symbolic acts are intended to destabilize the state are not part of the conceptualisations of most of the people who carry out the violent actions. Their views tend to be an unsophisticated belief that they are directly involved in an armed struggle that will have immediate consequences.

OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

The present study focuses on terrorists who have been active within an Islamic framework in India. However, to understand how the study of these individuals relates to a broader understanding of terrorism it is helpful to review briefly how such acts and the individuals who carry them out have been viewed within the social sciences.

First it is important to recognise that acts of violence with a political objective have always been with us. From the fight against Roman domination of Judea by Zealots in the 1st Century, through the assassins in the 13th Century (who were a breakaway faction of Shia Islam) to the Fenians in the 19th century, who challenged British rule in Ireland and the anarchists at the start of the 20th Century (who contributed to the start of the Great War, and through their writing articulated the notion of ‘the propaganda of the deed’) there have always been groups who sought to have an impact on public opinion and the stability of governments through attacks on people or buildings that were seen as being of political or ideological significance.

The emergence of nation states almost inevitably gave rise to forces that tried to challenge or overthrow those states by violent means. Thus by the late twentieth century well over 150 different terrorist organisations were known to exist around the world. The US State Department currently lists over 50 active organisations.

The longevity and number of such groups indicates that sources of terrorism are likely to be diverse and varied. So the present-day popular assumption that acts of political or ideological violence are likely to be related to Islamic belief systems is far from being valid. Indeed many books on terrorism written before 11th of September 2001 made no mention of Islam or *jihad* at all. Even the most elementary review of terrorist activities will show that people of all religions, and none, men and women, people under occupation in tyrannies and living freely in democracies, people who have clear and who have vague objectives, have all participated in some form of terrorist activity. The challenge therefore is to determine if there is any core to terrorist activity or if indeed the whole concept is too amorphous to be of any academic or practical value.

A Definition

It helps in our understanding of Islamic terrorism in India, against the backdrop of the variety of events that may be considered terrorist to provide some focus on what terrorism may be best considered to be. But as with most concepts that have had more currency in public debate than in academic discourse this is not a straightforward task. It is therefore of value to proffer one of the clearest definitions, even if only to help clarify questions that it raises. Richardson (2006) chose to define terrorism in terms of seven characteristics that any act must have in order to attract that label, as briefly listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Seven Crucial Characteristics for Terrorism (from Richardson, 2006)

1. Politically inspired
2. Violent or threatens violence
3. Communicates a message
4. Act and victim symbolically significant
5. Carried out by sub-state groups
6. Victim is different from the audience
7. Deliberate targeting of civilians

The central idea behind this definition is that the acts of violence are a political strategy carried out by groups that are not themselves an established state. From this perspective the strategy is very much aimed at carrying actions that have symbolic, propagandistic significance. An interesting illustration of the questions such a definition raises may be drawn from the little known N17 group in Greece, described by Kassimeris (2009). This has all the characteristics that Richardson requires to call them terrorist. But importantly, even in a group so dedicated to a Marxist mission, the close kinship ties within the group raise the question of how significant politics was for all those involved. In other words, when Richardson's formal (2006) definition is applied to characterising a particular group it may serve to highlight distinctions between the rhetoric of a group and the social and psychological processes that give rise to and maintain it.

Richardson's definition also draws attention to the idea that terrorist groups are sub-state groups, but the interplay between the organs of established states and apparently independent sub-state groups has been long appreciated. Indeed many elected leaders began their political careers as part of terrorist groups, such as Menachem Begin in Israel, Nelson Mandela in South Africa and most recently Gerry Adams in Northern Ireland. In some cases the styles of terrorist leadership is reflected in the form of political leadership, as Russell (2009) discusses in his account of the authoritarian leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov. He emerged out of terrorist attacks on Russia and much of his leadership is rooted in his violent past. Thus, as Gupta and his colleagues (2009) make clear, it is naïve to separate out the states that promote terrorism and the criminal activity that underwrites it if we are to understand its development and underlying processes.

In relation to Islamic terrorism in India, the dispute over the sovereignty of Kashmir and the relationship with Pakistan are being increasingly recognised as significant to understanding the many militant groups that have carried out attacks in India. The relationship of these groups to other fundamentalist Islamic-related violence in other parts of the world is also significant. The existence of training for militants who have a particular concern with Kashmiri independence also provides facilities that many other groups bent on violence can make use of.

So although Richardson's (2006) seven-point set of criteria do provide us with a clear definition of how to recognise terrorist activity, it is based on assumptions about what creates and drives terrorist activity which are essentially political. Although this aspect of some forms of terrorism cannot be denied consideration of the many, variety of acts deemed to be terrorist raises further questions about what the individuals involved in these acts understand their mission and role to be. The idea of a devoted, integrated group who make some strong, clear political statement through acts of violence may be the stereotypical vision of terrorism, but all the emerging information indicates that, like all stereotypes, it helps to know what we are looking for, but its existence in some pure form is exceedingly rare. The nature of the 'enemy' that terrorist groups identify with may not even be as obvious as would be expected. This is brought home particularly in Borgerson and Valeri's (2009) account of how some of the fiercely Christian Aryan Nations groups in the US are willing to co-operate with radical Islamists against some perceived common foe.

Difficulties in Studying Terrorists

The many difficulties in uncovering the truth about the actual people involved in terrorism cannot be overestimated. The only people available for interview, if access can be gained to them, are those who have been detected or captured, frequently through failure to achieve their goals. These people may not be representative of the possibly more determined individuals who were able to carry out their violent

acts. Even if access can be gained to these people, what they tell the security services is unlikely to be made public and what they tell the few researchers who have gained access (e.g., Merari, 1990, Siobelman, 2004) is likely to be distorted by their own views of their failure and the current incarceration in which they find themselves.

It is also important to point out, as Horgan (2004) does in some detail, that gaining access to people involved in or associated with any form of terrorism may be dangerous, and is often a lengthy drawn-out process. It is therefore understandable that most researchers are reluctant to follow this path and rely instead on secondary or tertiary sources. This is one of the reasons why public understanding of terrorists is often so misinformed, making it prey to the political distortions that Brinson and Stohl (2009) explore.

However, as Speckhard (2006) shows from her interviews with the families and associates of Chechen suicide bombers, it is important to attempt to get some understanding of the social and psychological processes involved in these outrages even if there is inevitable bias in the information obtained. Such explorations directly with those involved help to go beyond the statements made by terrorists, notably those by suicide bombers recorded for broadcast after their death, which are unlikely to give the whole story behind atrocities. Such broadcast statements have many objectives. For example, Merari (1990) suggests that the preparation of such a statement is part of the process by which the bomber is tied into the intended act. By committing him/herself in writing or on video to the action it is much more difficult to back-out at a later stage without a tremendous loss of face.

The schooling in the appropriate rhetoric for making such a statement is likely to be drawn from the writings and lectures of the leaders of terrorist movements as discussed by Sarangi and Canter in (2009). A clear example is the Tape of Mohammad Sidique Khan (2005), one of the 7/7 London bombers that has been widely broadcast. This is clearly a paraphrasing of the writings of Osama bin Laden and his apologists. It is therefore difficult to gauge from such broadcast material how totally it captures the psychology and personal perspective of the individual making the statement. Furthermore, it would be expected that such statements would claim international significance and grand motivations for the suicidal act rather than belittling it by reference to personal frustrations or individual experiences.

It is also important to be careful about generalising from what is known about the psychology of one set of terrorists to all others. Most information currently comes from very limited sources, typically the IRA or Palestinian terrorists. The changing world scene and evolving social processes also mean that there is unlikely to be one psychology of the terrorist valid for all places and all times.

Explanations of Terrorism

The current project based on interviews with Islamic terrorist in India seeks to develop accounts of how people find their way into these acts of violence. It is therefore useful to consider briefly the major explanations that have been given for terrorism that go beyond broad geopolitical consideration to examine directly the experiences of individuals. This will allow the results of the present study to be set against the existing explanations so that a fuller understanding can be developed.

Is Deprivation a Direct Cause of Terrorism?

In his review of the psychological causes of terrorism Moghaddam (2005) claims that ‘material factors such as poverty and lack of education are problematic as explanations of terrorist acts’. He quotes Coogan’s (2002) account of the IRA as giving no support to the view ‘that they are mindless hooligans drawn from the unemployed and unemployable’. The Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs reported in 2003 that captured Al-Qaeda terrorists were not typically from impoverished backgrounds and had reasonable levels of education. Indeed accounts of the people who carried out the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington showed that they did not come out of refugee camps, ignorant and lacking education (Bodansky, 2001). So a simple-minded analysis proposing that acts of terrorism are the first stages of a people’s revolution, being the actions of a down-trodden proletariat that has no other means of bettering its lot, does not have much empirical support.

Indeed any equation of terrorism with acts of revolution as a response to a repressive state need to be treated with great caution. The concomitant idea that if people are given at least some limited material comfort then they are unlikely to want overthrow their regime also needs careful evaluation. This was the view expressed so amusingly by George Orwell (1933) when he wrote:

“It is quite likely that fish-and-chips, art-silk stockings, tinned salmon, cut-price chocolate (five two-ounce bars for sixpence), the movies, the radio, strong tea, and the Football Pools have between them averted revolution.” *The Road to Wigan Pier* Chapter 5.

Just as it is a great over-simplification to propose that deprivation and oppression provoke acts of terrorism. So the proposal that no-one who lives in relative comfort would be willing to take up a cause that violently challenges the status quo must also be questioned. The search for the origins of terrorism of any sort as being fundamentally in material deprivation is not likely to prove successful.

A slightly more sophisticated argument would be that although an individual has some material comfort, if they live within a repressive regime the deprivation of their liberty is the source of their terrorist zeal. This view is also difficult to support from the facts. As Youngs (2005) makes clear in his analysis of the influence of political repression on the prevalence of terrorism, there is little correlation between relative degrees of political repression and ‘radicalism’. He compares various Middle Eastern countries, India and China and the source of revolution in other areas of the world to show that, if anything, repressive regimes serve to keep terrorist activity under control and that those who wish to attack civilians benefit from the freedoms associated with democracy.

To account for the greater dissatisfaction and related violence in less repressive regimes it is fruitful to consider the widely explored issue of ‘relative deprivation’. Walker and Smith (2002) review over 50 years of study of how people tend to compare their own experiences with that of others that they know about and assess their personal deprivation relative to those other experiences. This subjective relativity has been taken to explain many paradoxes such as why working women are more willing to accept disadvantageous pay differentials than would be expected (Crosby 1982), because they compared themselves with other women rather than men, or the lack of impact of the removal of apartheid on inter-racial attitudes in South Africa (Duckitt and Mphuting, 1998), because the racial groups still made comparisons within their own groups.

Relative Deprivation has also been elaborated by distinguishing between personal experiences and experience perceived to be shared by a social group (Smith, & Leach, 2004). These are mainly somewhat artificial, laboratory based experimental studies because it is so difficult to establish clearly what an individual’s view of the experiences of a social group is. Nonetheless they do indicate that when a person’s identity is closely associated with membership of a particular group then the belief that

the group as a whole experiences certain deprivations can have a significant influence on that person's levels of dissatisfaction beyond their own personal comparisons. These complexities thus help to point towards the need to consider the individual psychological processes and how an individual makes sense of his/her experiences rather than relying on some notion of the objective, material situation the person is part of.

Mental Illness and Suicide Bombing

The psychological explanation of suicide bombing is particularly difficult to fathom. It seems to go against all notions of self-preservation unless the person was out of contact with reality. As a consequence one common view about the psychology of suicide bombers is that they must be 'mad' in some sense of being severely mentally disturbed. However, even an elementary consideration of the July 2005 bombings in London would make clear that the perpetrators could not have been insane in the usual sense of out of contact with reality, drugged or even highly-trained fanatics. The New York aeroplane hijackers similarly indicated a determination and coolness of purpose that is not compatible with a psychosis or other extreme form of mental illness. This accords with the reviews of both Silke (2003) and Moghaddam (2005), who make it clear that there is no evidence that suicide bombers are overtly mentally disturbed. The five failed Palestinian suicide bombers that Soibelman (2004) had interviewed showed no signs of mental illness and were able to discuss many matters with their Interviewers in an apparently rational way.

Far from being disturbed there is some evidence that those recruiting people to commit these atrocities go to some pains to exclude people who may be mentally unstable. Merari (1990) claims that only a minority of all those who volunteer to be suicide bombers are selected to do so. This is understandable in military terms. A person who was mentally unstable could not be relied upon to focus and follow through with the desired objective and so would weaken the whole operation and put disclosure of its methods at risk.

Brainwashing?

The graphic metaphor for clearing a person of previously held beliefs, washing their brains, in order to insert some alien set of perspectives, has become a further explanation of how people could turn from reasonably well adjusted citizens to violent terrorists. This perspective puts people such as Osama bin Laden and the Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin in roles that have only ever been demonstrated clearly in George Du Mauriers fictional story of the control of the opera singer Trilby by the manipulative Svengali. Many other studies show that in real life it is difficult to demonstrate the possibility of such quasi-occult powers (cf., Heap and Kirsch, 2006 for a review of these issues).

This view of the influence of terrorist leaders also implies a very strong hierarchy, very similar indeed to what would be expected in a rigid military structure. In general, however, as with all illegal groups (Canter and Alison, 2000), especially those spread over a wide geography, it is not possible to maintain the top-down discipline that is *de rigueur* for a standing army. Instead, what Atran (2004) calls a 'hydra-headed network' has been proposed as more likely to be the norm. Mullins (2009) has shown that such networks have an evolving structure, changing dynamically in relation to the task at hand.

In a detailed study of the Al-Qaeda network, Sageman (2004) shows just how complex and self-generating terrorist networks can be. These loose networks come about partly because illegal

organisations face such challenges to preserving the identification and communication processes that are crucial for the effectiveness of legitimate ones (as Canter, 2000, discusses) that they have to rely on other ways of operating. The indications are that they survive by encouraging and supporting small, independent groups, over which they have very little direct control (Altran, 2004). But this requires that the groups are very much self-defined and self-motivated, rather than being fiercely manipulated by some charismatic leader.

One important implication of this mechanism of autonomous, self-generating groups as mechanism for carrying out terrorism is that it can be traced at least to the writings of 19th century anarchists such as Michael Bakunin (cf., Anarchist Archives, 2006), who saw revolution emerging out of spontaneous secret societies who combine together to overthrow the status quo. The intelligentsia were to articulate the disquiet and aspirations of the masses who would then find their own ways into revolution.

The Role of Religious Ideology

If it is not some particular guru who brainwashes followers, then it has often been thought that it is a general religious ideology that is drawn on to formulate destructive intentions. The fact that all the London and USA attackers were Moslem and that Palestinian suicide bombers are typically Moslem has led to the assumption in many quarters that there are some inherent seeds in Islam that provide the basis for suicide bombing. Certainly as Sarangi and Canter (2009) explain there are streams of thought that interpret the Quran as endorsing violence against non-believers. But the dominant Islamic tradition is nonetheless extremely tolerant.

Even when considering suicide bombers there is nothing new or particularly Islamic about them. There is the ancient Jewish exemplar in the biblical account of Samson bringing the Temple down upon the Philistines as a way of escaping from his own degradation and death at their hands. In modern time, as the widely quoted report by Gunaratna (2003) documents, suicide bombing is certainly not limited to Moslem terrorists. The Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) that has carried out many suicide bombings in Turkey is anti-religious, drawing on Marxist-Leninist ideology, but with a very strong Nationalist, rather than religious, orientation. What Gunaratna (2003) calls 'ethno-nationalism', rather than religious doctrine, is what drove the 'Tamil Tigers' to carry out suicide bombing in Sri Lanka and India.

Of course, the most well-known use of suicide as a military means was by Japanese pilots in World War II. This had nothing to do with either a challenge to state oppression or Islam. Yet its parallels to recent suicide bombings has been recognised by some European newspapers referring to these attacks with the Japanese label of *kamikaze*, literally meaning the wind (or spirit) of God.

The use of military personnel as self-destructive missiles in World War II may help to indicate something of the processes by which people think themselves into this desperate final act. In his detailed study of 'Japan's suicide samurai' Lamont-Brown (1997) reveals that Japanese military leaders were initially reluctant to use this tactic that was so wasteful of trained pilots and aeroplanes, but that towards the end of the war they saw no other way of preventing the American fleet from landing troops on Japanese soil. A special airborne 'Divine Thunderbolts Corps' was therefore established. The pilots in this corps were initially drawn from well-trained airmen, who came from strongly nationalist families. They saw themselves as upholding the honour and traditions of their families. But as the war progressed young men with very limited training, from working class backgrounds, were drafted in to carry on the attacks.

The early suicide pilots endorsed a mythology of devotion to the Emperor, who was regarded as a God, such that it was an honour to die in his service. They believed they would be re-incarnated as cherry blossom in the nationalist Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo, such that this flower became their symbol. Those who came after them appear to have been more directly motivated by the dishonour of failure and the pride their family would feel in their success. The shame that would be brought on their family if they came back alive was regarded as unbearable. Certainly through the names of the squadrons, their symbols and rituals the pilots believed that they were 'divine wings' wreaking a terrible toll on the enemy. In fact, once the US Navy got over the initial shock of such apparently senseless attacks, *kamikaze* assaults proved to be futile in stopping the advance of the US military on Japan. But the determination the Japanese showed of fighting to the last breath may have been influential in the decision to drop the atomic bomb.

There are doubtless some parallels in present-day suicide bombing, notably a conviction in the great significance of their actions and the often quoted belief in rewards in the after-life. Perhaps of more significance, similar to 'non-military' suicide, is the view that there was no other way for Japan to defend itself against a greatly superior military force. However the fact that all five of the failed July 21st London Bombers were caught alive without any further violence shows that the British situation is very different from the Japanese. For those London suicide bombers, at least, life was preferable to 'honourable' death.

The *kamikaze* pilots also show us that the concept of 'religious zeal' needs to be treated with caution. The Shinto tradition of which they were a part claimed it was honourable to die protecting the emperor. This has analogies to the Quranic claims that 'whoever fights for the cause of God, whether he dies or triumphs, on him we shall bestow a rich recompense' (4:72, Quran - Penguin books edition 2003, page 68). But they are both very different types of belief systems. The tradition of the Japanese Emperor as a God was greatly diluted after the war in a way that it is difficult to imagine happening to beliefs in The Prophet and His teachings. It therefore is of value to explore in the current study the possibility that religious ideology may provide a skeleton that is fleshed out in accordance with the experiences and self-image of any given individual.

But as with any reference to a broad ideology an idea cannot be blamed for the people who hold it. Many millions of people endorse fundamentalist Islam without interpreting it as meaning they should commit acts of self-destructive violence. The religion may offer up a belief system on which potential suicide bombers can draw, but it cannot be accounted as the primary cause for their actions. To understand the processes that give rise to suicide bombing, as with all other aspects of terrorism, the social processes of which the individual is a part need to be considered and cognitive and emotional aspects of the individual that give rise to a commitment to acts of terrorism.

Terrorism as Process

In his earlier writing Horgan (2005) has developed the important argument that terrorism is not an act but a process of which a person is a part. Moghaddam's (2005) 'staircase' model of terrorism makes a similar point of a person entering into and becoming part of an ever-more involving commitment to violence for political or ideological ends. The framework for this is a mixture of first, recognition that the group with which the terrorist identifies is distinct from and threatened by some other external group and, secondly, that there are culturally-remembered or experienced causes of grievance that are nursed by the group to which the terrorist belongs.

The role of grievances is well illustrated by Ross (2009) when examining three very different terrorist groups in different parts of the world. He emphasises in particular the roles these grievances play in keeping the group in existence over many years. The grievances become a way of specifying the special, distinct identity of the group and what fuels its antagonism to those who the group see as their enemies. An important point here is that it is not the deprivation or other degrading experiences themselves that are seen as central cause of acts of violence but the interpretation of these to generate a profound sense of grievance.

The grievance, however, only has to give rise to a few people acting violently before the explosive mix of emotional turmoil and direct experience draws others into the destructive cycle. Ferguson and Burgess (2009) show how for many people it is the psychological consequences of being part of violence that itself can set up a continuing process of terrorist aggression. For these individuals the world becomes framed in terms of its potential for bloodshed. This has long term consequences that the authorities ignore at their peril. It can mean that even after the apparently successful peace process, as in Northern Ireland, there are still many people for whom the precipitating factors such as direct experience of violence and perceived grievance have not gone away. The possibility of the violence re-emerging will thus still be present for at least a generation.

The perception of grievances and associated routes into terrorism need not be as direct as in Northern Ireland as Williams' (2009) case study illustrates. Faheem Khalid Lodhi was well established in Australia as an architect without any personal experiences to lead him into acts of violence. It was indirect contact through people he interacted with in his original homeland of Pakistan that seemed to open the way for him to prepare a terrorist attack. There are many parallels here to other terrorists and would-be terrorists in Britain, Spain and the USA. They start to define themselves in terms of a particular social group that is itself defined in terms of feelings of outrage and frustration for which terrorist acts become the focal outlet.

There is considerable evidence that these feeling of outrage, fuelled by a shared set of grievances can help some individuals to justify many criminal actions. This means that the fundamental criminality of their actions can readily overlap with what is more commonly thought of as organised crime. This may well be a two-way street. Terrorist groups carry out crime to fund their activities. Or, as Vishnevetsky (2009) shows from his study of youth gangs in Chechnya, organised crime may be the route into terrorism for some individuals. This accords with the issues explored Gupta and his colleagues (2009). They show that distinguishing between terrorists and organised criminals is often difficult. There are however, important, albeit subtle, differences that need to be determined in order to deal appropriately with the somewhat dissimilar challenges they pose to the social order.

The spread of interactions between terrorism and organised crime is also paralleled in the ways in which terrorist acts drift into state structures, as already mentioned, being covertly or overtly supported by national authorities. In this regard the actions of Chechyian leader Shamil Basayev, who mastermind the Budennovsk, Dubrovka and Beslan suicidal, hostage-taking raids, as acts against Russian control of Chechnya, would place those actions outside of Richardson's (2006) definition of terrorism. However, most of the processes that can be recognised in more obviously terrorist groups were present in these violent attacks. This perspective on the Chechyian terrorist attacks within Russia are especially useful to explore because it seems that the removal of Shamil Basayev and his replacement in Chechnya by another warlord, Ramzan Kadyrov has changed the nature of the relationship of Chechnya with Russia.

Kadyrov seems to have achieved a more equitable relationship with the Russians by coalescing what Russell (2009) describes as the 'needs' of the Chechyans with the 'greed' of those he needs to manage

the country. Interestingly this includes weaning the Chechians of the Wahhabi approach to Islam which Basayev utilized to legitimise his actions and instead support the less aggressive Sufi tradition that had been dominant in Chechnya in earlier times. Thus Kadyrov's activities serve to show the importance for any insurgent groups of how the appropriate actions for dealing with their grievances are interpreted. The less attractive aspect of Kadyrov's dominion is its illustration of how generations of insurgency against oppression provide a landscape in which vicious, totalitarian rule can take root and prosper, suffocating the rule of law.

Implications for the Present Study

Most of the reasons offered in the Social Sciences for why people become terrorists draw on individual experiences, or of grievances that are supported within a given culture. There is no support for explanations derived from deprivation or mental illness. There is considerable support for the proposal that organised crime and terrorism can go hand in hand. In other words, what emerges is the prospect that terrorists are relatively typical of the community from which they come, but have a mission that derives from their interpretation of the situation they interpret themselves as being part of.

In order to test and develop these ideas further it is necessary to get closer to the perspectives of individuals themselves who have been involved in acts of violence. This requires exploring with them the pathways through which they became actively involved. There is the further question of whether *jihadi* terrorists in India are similar to terrorists who have been described in other contexts.

PROCEDURE FOR THE PRESENT STUDY

The interviews were arranged through the defence lawyers of the interviewees, and civil rights lawyers who have contacts with convicted individuals. Professor Manoranjan Mohanty, Emeritus Professor at University of Delhi, who also has active involvement in studying this area, has been very helpful in opening up contacts as well. In addition some interviews were arranged through the prison authorities who have approached convicted terrorists on our behalf. All interviewees were volunteers who signed informed-consent agreements.

The interviews were carried out in Urdu or Hindi, and in one case in English, as the interviewee preferred. They were recorded and transcribed and are currently being translated into English for in-depth analysis.

The interview procedure consisted of two main components:

1. A 'narrative' interview in which the interviewee is encouraged to give an uninterrupted free flowing account with minimum prompts of how they see themselves and the events and people that have helped shape their lives and who they now are. They are encouraged to explain the processes and stages that gave rise to their involvement in terrorist acts. To generate a thorough, emotionally consistent and conceptually detailed, chronologically ordered life story both requires, and therefore ensures, it is a psychologically valid narrative that is obtained. All interviewees were convicted of terrorist offences, but nonetheless it is useful to note that the psychological value of exploring their world-views and conceptual systems does not rely on admissions of guilt. Indeed, the distortions revealed inadvertently in the narrative accounts of the small sub-sample of the interviewees who deny their offences are proving to be highly informative.
2. Secondly, a *Repertory Grid* is completed. This focuses on the key people in the respondent's life and the constructs that characterise those people. In addition his view of himself before and during his terrorist activities is incorporated as well as how he would like to see himself ideally. The detailed analysis of these grids will form part of the second phase of this study and so will not be described in the present report.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE INTERVIEWED

The sample includes a wide range of individuals who were involved in many different attacks between 1993 and 2005 as shown from the following summary.

Attacks

The interviewees were drawn from those associated with the following terrorist attacks:

- Series of bombs in Mumbai in 1993
- Kidnap of British tourists in Delhi in 1995.
- Hi-jacking Indian airline flight from Kathmandu to Delhi in 1999.
- Attack on the Red Fort, Delhi in 2000 and the related suicidal attack on the Army barracks.
- Attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 in which 7 people were killed and 18 injured.
- Mulund Station bomb in Mumbai in 2003, which killed 10 people and injured 70.
- Bombing at Gateway to India in Mumbai in 2003 in which 44 people were killed and 150 injured.
- Sarojini Nagar Market, Pharganj and Kalkaji bombings in Delhi in 2005, killing 50 and injuring 104.

Groups and Movements

The people interviewed had links with the following organisations that support *jihad*. Further details of each of these are given in Appendix I at the end of this report.

- Al Jihad (AJ)
- Dawood Gang (D-Coy)
- Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
- Harkat ul Ansar (HuA)
- Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
- Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
- Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT)
- Muslim Janbaz Force (MJF)
- Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)
- Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)
- Tehrik-e-Jihad (TEJ)

Age Distribution

Individuals varied in age at the time of interview from 19 to 60 years of age, with a mean age of 33 years, with the distribution as shown in the following table.

Age	Number
< 20 (=19)	2
21-30	15
31-34	8
35-40	8
41-50	13
51-60	3
Total	49

Some had of course been in prison for a considerable length of time and others were still new to this experience. However, the range does mean that the interviews could be regarded as covering at least two generations of people who supported *jihadi* activity. It also means that we were able to explore the experiences and beliefs of people who would be at the forefront of violent radical activity if they were not incarcerated or disengaged.

Education

In intellectual ability and education they ranged from one person who had submitted a PhD to others who were only semi-literate and had learning difficulties. This also shows that wide range of people who become involved in this sort of violence. As other researchers have noted, terrorists are not inevitably drawn from the underdogs in society. Nor are they typically highly articulate intellectuals who have clearly made a well informed choice. People across the full range of intellectual abilities can be drawn into violent radicalism.

Situation at time of Interview

Although the majority of the interviewees were in prison at the time of the interview, almost one third were currently disengaged from any terrorist activity and were interviewed outside prison. This enabled the exploration of the conditions of disengagement and the consideration of individuals who the Indian legal system no longer considered to be a threat although they had been active in the past.

Situation at time of Interview	Number	Percent
Disengaged	14	28.6
Prison	35	71.4
Total	49	100.0

Nationality

Although all those interviewed were Muslim almost three-quarters held Indian nationality.

Nationality	Number	Percent
Indian	36	73.5
Pakistan	13	26.5
Total	49	100.0

This is a finding of some significance and has relevance to insurgent activity in other countries where their nationals carry out terrorist attacks. It shows that even in India with its history of conflict with Pakistan that the people who carry out terrorist activity are more likely to be residents of the country they are attacking than be incomers.

Degree of Involvement

The interviews allowed consideration of the degree of involvement with *jihadi* activities. It was important to establish whether the people who allowed themselves to be interviewed were drawn from a limited level of involvement. For example, it may have been thought that only those with a very limited involvement may have come forward, or leaders wishing to promulgate propaganda. Determining level of involvement is to some degree subjective and had to be gleaned from a combination of what was known about the interviewees and what they revealed in the interview. However, four general levels could be identified with some confidence as shown in the table below.

The table shows that a range of levels from very minor involvement (in only one case) to a total commitment in almost two thirds, was present in the respondents. The fact that over half those interviewed were complete involved with terrorist activities, according to police reports and the court decisions as well as responses, lends credibility to the validity of the information obtained through the interviews.

The degree of involvement has been categorised as follows; 5 denotes complete involvement in acts of violent attack and killings of civilian population. 4 means the individual was involved to a high degree, but may not have been involved in killings. 3 means an active supporter who may not be involved in actual crimes. 2 indicates minor involvement, mostly without intent/knowledge. 1 means was not directly involved in any criminal act as far as can be established

Involvement	Number	Percent
Minor	1	2.0
Active supporter	13	26.5
High involvement	6	12.2
Complete	29	59.2
Total	49	100.0

Status in the Organisation

Although it was not possible to assign actual ranks to individuals in what were often rather ad hoc groups some assessment of their relative seniority in the organisation was possible from the information available about the respondents and their answers to questions. Five broad levels were identified in this way from very low level ‘foot soldiers’ to senior leaders as indicated in the following table. The majority of those interviewed were relatively junior in their organisation, although one in five were very senior commanders. This can be taken to mean that the responses obtained are probably typical of the rank and file in these organisations. These are indeed the people who plant the bombs and directly carry out acts of violence. Their views on themselves and their activities are rarely available, so often being hidden by the rhetoric and broadcast propaganda of the leadership.

Status		Number	Percent
Cadre	1	16	32.7
	2	13	26.5
	3	7	14.3
	4	3	6.1
Senior leader	5	10	20.4
Total		49	100.0

Culpability

One final general aspect of the respondents that was important to determine was whether they considered themselves really culpable for their actions or wished in some way to distance themselves from any guilt. As shown in the table below the majority admitted their guilt but over 40% either denied they were involved at all or insisted that they were not aware of what they were involved in and thus were not terrorists. This bias is understandable in terms of them being willing to be interviewed. The deniers doubtless hoped that their responses would help to exonerate them. However, in nearly all cases the evidence of their active involvement was very strong indeed. Furthermore, their background that led them to become part of an incident and thus be arrested was nonetheless of great relevance to understanding pathways into radicalisation.

Category	Number	Percent
Admits Guilt	28	57
Self-exculpatory	21	43

Place of Interview

	Number	Percent
Arthur Road Prison, Mumbai	8	16.3
Central Jail, Dum Dum, Kolkatta	2	4.1
Central Jail, Kot Bhalwal, Jammu, Kashmir	6	12.2
Central Jail, Thane	2	4.1
Kashmir Valley	14	28.6
Presidency Jail, Kolkatta	1	2.0
Tihar Central Prisons, Delhi	16	32.7
Total	49	100.0

Summary of the Sample

Although all of the 49 people interviewed agreed to talk of their own free will, being clear that they could withdraw at any time, the variety of means of accessing them cross a range of locations throughout India, does seem to have generated a useful range of respondents. They varied in age, educational background, organisations to which they were committed, levels of involvement in those groups and the incidents in which they had been active. So although a sample of 49 voluntary interviewees can never be presented as a representative sample, they do cover a reasonable range of individuals and thus may be taken to illustrate the main pathways into radicalisation.

All of those interviewed were Moslem, but interestingly the majority were of Indian nationality. The largest proportion of them did admit their guilt, although as expected there was a significant minority who denied it. Most had definite and in-depth involvement in the group that carried out the atrocity in which they participated. This is thus a unique sample of active terrorists an understanding of whose experiences and background will contribute substantially revealing the various pathways to Islamic radicalisation.

BACKGROUND TO UNDERSTANDING PATHWAYS OF RESPONDENTS

During the course of the interviews a number of issues emerged, relating both to historical and more recent events. Understanding these provides a useful framework for considering the thought processes and rhetorical roots of violent actions, as well as the significance of particular incidents. A summary of them therefore follows.

Historical Factors.

Although there are current concerns that are used by many of those interviewed as significant in their own radicalisation it is important to note that in the case of the Indian subcontinent the constant shifting battle lines between Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist and Hindu followers has resulted in various social, educational, political and economical groups forming. This was further complicated by the arrival of the British Empire in the 19th century, which reinforced or backed specific tribal lines or cultural, religious groups to ensure control in those areas (i.e., the establishment of the British Raj municipalities, which resulted in land being confiscated from farmers and other areas). In very broad terms many groups, Muslim and non-Muslim, still have grudges to settle with other communities and groups. The current conflicts and the need to establish freedom for Kashmir and Afghanistan are seen as a continuing battle against the earlier depredations of the colonial powers. This perspective is used by the JeM, HM and LeT groups as a core recruitment pitch is to reclaim freedom, land and justice for those who have in history lost all these.

Others take a less geo-political and more embedded Islamic historical stance. Their aims are often enshrined in the notion that they are trying to bring back a time of ‘peace and tranquillity’ or a forgotten ‘utopia’. This backdrop provides a general platform in which claims to land and resources, taken in more recent history, are legitimatised.

This mix of the desire for the ancient ‘golden age’ to get away from the corruption of the modern world is illustrated clearly in the responses of S3. He stated that society should live and abide by God’s laws, claiming that Islamic law is as relevant today as it was 1400 years ago. Current society and laws are biased towards those who have money so he would like the return of the Islamic state. He supports this claim by reference to various reports commissioned by the Indian Central government which highlighted inadequacies and corruption in relation to different massacres. S12 also combined a belief in what he had heard about present day abuse of Muslims in India with a reference back to the halcyon days of the Mughal Emperors as a time of peace and tranquillity.

Key Events are used to Reinforce or Build upon the Need for Action.

Across the interviews various incidents are mentioned repeatedly as of particular significance in providing evidence for the abuses against which violent action is the only redress. These events are the basis for eliciting anger, frustration and to reinforce the belief in victimisation feelings and concepts.

They are used to fuel a rationalisation process in which targets are dehumanised. In most of the material on the internet referring to the incidents the usage of words such as women, children and elderly are used prominently. In several of the interviews the respondents claim it is their duty and an honour to sacrifice themselves to protect those who cannot protect themselves or to extract retribution for abuses supported by the Indian government.

The main events that are referred to by most respondents are as follows:

- **Violence that ensued at the time of partition (1947)** in which it is reported nearly a million people were killed.
- **Babri Masjid Demolition (1992)**, where a mosque was destroyed by Hindu followers who believed it to be on the site of a holy Hindu shrine. Resulted in over 6 months rioting in different parts of India with attacks on both Hindu and Muslim areas as well as Sikh areas. Estimated 10, 000 people died in the resulting violence.
- **Gujarat Massacre (2002)**. No clear narrative of events exists however a train carrying right wing Hindu party activists was attacked in a small town in Gujarat. The occupants of the train (59) were all killed. As result of this attack riots broke out in the state in which over 1000 people, mainly Muslims, were killed. Over 61,000 Muslims and over 10,000 Hindus fled their homes and business as a result of the violence.

After two official reports, the first of which was deemed illegal by the central government, no clear prosecutions have been brought forward. The state government under the BJP Hindu nationalists was condemned for their slow investigative response and in allowing potential revenge killings to take place.

- The ongoing conflict in **Jammu and Kashmir** since the partition (1947) or the on-going conflict in **Palestine** and other conflicts around the world.
- The **creation of Bangladesh (formally East Pakistan)** and the role that the Indian army/secret service played in undermining Pakistani soldiers.

The invasion of Afghanistan by Russia (80's) and now by the US. Some respondents made reference to the fact that Indian operatives have been working in these areas for many years to bring disruption and kill Muslims.

Sachar Committee Report (2006) commissioned by the Indian Central government to look at the economical, social and educational needs of the different communities and minorities in India was mentioned by some respondents. Clearly this was produced after the incidents in which they were involved but they see it as confirmation of their actions. The report concluded that Muslim segments of the community had been excluded or suffered substantial more poverty than other segments. The report advised the reallocation of various budgets relating to educational and social reforms, but it is generally recognised that progress on this has been limited. Some of the respondents see the report as confirmation that previous Hindu national governments have purposefully neglected or institutionally subjugated the Muslim population.

From responses that cite the above incidents it can also be noted that they lead to the argument that the Indian government and other agencies are part of some generic 'enemy' thereby supporting the idea that 'they are all against us' and this government and government staff and civil staff become acceptable targets.

Brief Overview of Some of the Islamic Concepts Used in the Rationalisation Process.

Many of the respondents draw on ideas that they regard as fundamental to Islamic beliefs. As Sarangi and Canter (2009) point out there are many interpretations of Islamic principles as is the case with any great religion, but the following points are useful to understand.

Faith:

Respondents refer to '*iman*' which is another word for faith, acceptance and belief. For example S3 refers to his belief becoming stronger once he has attended a series of talks and activities. In most of the respondent's cases they all refer to attending talks, events or rallies. It is through these talks that his desire to join a movement became stronger as within some talks the concept of defending those who cannot defend themselves as well as the perceived desire of justice is propagated.

In some of these talks a direct or indirect link is inferred that your faith is weak if you are unable to support or provide support to those who are actively seeking justice and preserving the 'faith' in conflict areas.

Brotherhood or fraternity

Within the talks a further key emotive concept is the notion that all Muslims are part of '1' nation like a body in which if one part of the body hurts then all the rest of the parts will also feel the pain. Therefore if you do not feel pain about the atrocities then you are not part of that nation and that your faith is weak.

Even though there may be differences between groups none of the splinter groups or factions would disagree with the five pillars of the Islamic faith. In this respect many jihadist movements propagate the need to re-join as one nation without boundaries. This appeals to those who are often influenced by idealist and romanticised notions of the past.

Jihad and Pacifism

All respondents accept the viewpoint that Muslims cannot be pacifists. But many also recognise that there are clear rules of engagement and objectives in warfare i.e., fighters cannot harm individuals considered 'innocent', such as women, children, livestock, religious buildings, etc. S9 refers to some of the key points i.e., *jihad* or actual armed struggle is not legitimate against those who do not inhibit your rights to practise Islam.

The talks they attend and media portrayals they watch carry stark images of the abuses of Muslim women and children in particular or those who could not defend themselves or their honour. An inference made here is that if you do not feel their pain or frustration your *iman* or belief is weak. To strengthen it therefore you must actively avenge their honour.

Combined with the notion of the duplicity or ineffective nature of government policies, police and other agencies many groups would recruit individuals possibly saying that 'nobody else will defend Islam or the Muslim honour'.

Jihad and Innocence

It is important to note that the term ‘innocent’ is a term that can take on a variety of meanings and is used and applied selectively by the different movements or militia. For instance S2, S3, S36 and S47 have a clear idea of who they oppose and who they wish to fight i.e. the Indian army, Hindu Nationalist leadership etc. However some of these respondents indicate their disillusionment when lay people on Indian streets become the targets.

PATHWAYS TO TERRORISM

Against the general historical backdrop and series of significant incidents, given a particular perspective by distinct interpretations of Islam, a number of different pathways into radical, violent action have been identified. The process of identifying them at this stage of the project has been to examine the dominant themes in each of the interviews then to cross-check between each interview, so refining the major themes that emerge. This content analysis system, known as *Grounded Theory* has been widely used for data of this sort and is often linked to the work of Glaser and Straus (1967).

1) **The Zealot**

A number of individuals could be clearly identified who revealed a distinct pathway that had a strongly religious framework. These do not see any immediate or direct personal benefits for fighting. They were committed to a general idea of the way the world should be. This was particularly expressed in the need to restore or uphold the “banner of Islam” feeling it is their duty and Islamic obligation to fight and support those who are fighting for the return of an Islamic state. This is often interpreted as requiring the expulsion of the Indian army from Kashmir and other places considered to be fundamentally Muslim. Their routes into action were therefore typically through contacts with other religious fundamentalist individuals. However, it should be noted that these religious beliefs were usually conflated with political and even nationalist issues. The important point is that Islamic belief was for these people the pathway into violent action, even though they interpreted its manifestation with reference to geo-political issues.

The following distinct stages along the course to violence could be identified:

1. A religious family environment in which being a Moslem and defending that faith were inextricably entwined.
2. Exposure to videos and tapes that proclaimed the atrocities that Moslem brothers and sisters had experienced and the hands of non-Moslems.
3. Particular events in recent history are identified as clear and present evidence that only an armed struggle will right the wrongs.
4. Access to *jihadi* individuals or groups who were respected within the community and regarded as honourable, trustworthy members of the faith.

These individuals develop a simple, clear belief that they need to contribute to a great cause in which they have to uphold the banner of Islam or defend those who cannot defend themselves. They identify strongly with a notion of an historical idealism of how Muslim communities were and the glory that was attributed to those days. This is often linked directly to the current situation facing Muslim communities on the ground in different parts of the world. They want to actively work towards developing an Islamic state with ideal of uniting the different factions within the Muslim communities. They have accepted that armed struggle is a viable option, which is further justified by the need to gain 'justice' for those who have been ill-treated. They have a general distrust of governments and other organisations that, for example, in the case of the Indian army is thus seen as a legitimate target.

Initial Route to Violent Action: These people had contact with groups or movements and given access to emotive material when they were quite young, certainly by their early teens.

As S2 explained:

Every week there would be talks in the local mosque and collections for the families in Kashmir and other areas.... I would go with my friends and sometimes my uncle to events (gatherings) and listen to the things that were happening in Kashmir and how the Indian army was abusing those in Kashmir.... I also started to collect cassettes and talks by different mujahids (warriors who sacrificed everything to defend Islam).... M[aulana] Masood Azhar's talks were very good because he used to talk openly about how we can only change things if we changed our lives and accepted Islam fully ... my friends and I would help the mujahids collect donations

Islam is everything and to be a true Muslim I had to stand up and do something about things happening in Kashmir... the Indian government stood by and are guilty of destroying Barbri Masjid and they have to pay for this... not one person has been found guilty or charged with what happened on that day...many Muslims died in the Gujarat massacre when Indian police and other people stood by and allowed houses to be destroyed, women to be raped and children killed.

S3 Explained it this way:

I am a religious man of sorts. I was not interested in diverting my mind and time to immoral things... I read books and the Quran regularly.

When I was young I started to pay interest in these things I started to read and listen and saw what was happening. My friends and I would gather and talk about how we could make a change. We would go to talks and events. Our house was destroyed by rioters my family and I suffered a lot ... I did not want revenge but wanted justice... which there was none. The Gujarat massacre stuck in my mind.... Muslims are part of India's history its glory, we also fought for its independence but we are not regarded as such.... all these things are about land and greed.

The khilafat should be restored... it is a privilege to have society structured the way God would want it. The khilafat was not just a power structure but a unifying force in which Muslim and non-Muslim obeyed their creator....Muslims ruled Spain for 800 years... they were in power for over a 1000 years in which India's glory was at its peak.... There should be one ummah.

The expansion of Muslim empire is a matter of very great significance. The conquest of countries is necessary for the spread of Islamic rule. Establishing Islamic rule is a duty on every Muslim.

S47 also showed how early the indoctrination was, associating being religious with fighting against a ruthless enemy:

When I was young my father would take me everywhere with him and often we would go to talks and events where my cousin would have stalls selling Islamic material and gifts. At these talks many people used to collect money for the fighters and those struggling in Kashmir and different parts of Afghanistan. Many of my friends would help the collections in the local areas for the fighters. We felt it was our honour to do such things.

S12 showed that the relationship between religious and political ideas was with him from a very early age. He also makes the important point that he grew up believing that all Hindus were implacably anti-Muslim, which now that he is in prison with them he realises was naive:

I don't know what people think of jihad now but in those days cassettes and talks about jihad and how many Muslims were standing up to the atrocities were everywhere. I started listening to these at a young age.

When I was listening to the talks about how Islam is the key to change these atrocities and how we must actively change a picture was painted that Hindus wanted to kill all Muslims ... strange but when I'm here I meet so many Hindus and they are just like us normal and good.

S47 Indicated very clearly the source of his beliefs and how early in his life he was exposed to this information:

From the media reports and CD's and information which was being distributed around the Middle East when I was there. CD's were made to send a true picture of what was happening in these areas. CDs are still in circulation in Pakistan and other places. Some may even say that it was state sponsored genocide... as the police and others let Babri Masjids be destroyed.... laws and the state are all biased just against Muslims.

Education/Occupation: Within the sample the respondents have basic high school educational attainment. They were not high flyers and found serious education something of a challenge, making them much more vulnerable to being convinced by confident, fluent leaders who cloak their claims in references to the Quran. Their employment had typically been as semi-skilled or lowly tradesmen so they have no understanding of how large-scale organisations or political processes operate.

S2:

Learning was important in the family but I couldn't concentrate on school work so I started working early in different jobs.

Family

Most of these 'idealist' had experienced identified financial hardship, coming from low-income families. These families were often located in rural/ slum or outskirts of towns/cities. Due to the caste system in India and Pakistan many families would refer themselves as lower middle class – this label does not directly refer to their economic stature but their social stature. Within the family unit often the respondent was at the younger end and was possibly married.

S2

I wouldn't say we were rich but not poor either.... We did not have much money to spare when my father died my older brother was the one that worked....

S3

I travelled to Saudi Arabia to work in a catering company....later went to Iraq to work in a hospital but returned to India to help my mum and wife. I wasn't much bothered about money in my life. I did not even save. On many occasions I idled away my time. I would join my electrician friend as his apprentice and would pick up few ways of doing things... we were passing through hard times I had no proper job. My mum sold our flat And for a while I stayed out in an outside room.

Significant Events: All these individuals were keen to mention events that illustrated for them the barbarity of the enemy and their need to fight back. Sometimes there are direct personal experiences as for S3

In 1993 bombs were exploded in Mumbai. The house of my father-in-law was ransacked by Hindu mob. My wife and children were staying there... their safety concerned me all the time.

But also less immediately personal events:

It is common knowledge of how many Muslim women and children were raped and murdered in the different riots and carnage all the way from Babri Masjids destruction to the Gujarat massacre.

For S12 these were more general incidents:

My feelings were always looking at what was happening in Kashmir and it was cruel... that there are cruelties on Muslims brothers in Kashmir. My family originally came from Kashmir so there has always been some link.... My friends and I and also my grandfather would discuss about atrocities what was happening and how this could continue in this day and age?

On T.V and other media you would see the atrocities being committed by the Indian army and those who support them (i.e., politicians). This could not go on I had to do something.

General Beliefs about Atrocities: A common refrain was about the atrocities that they knew about from the videos and other material that they had spent a considerable time watching:

S2:

When you see the destruction on one side and the way in which families are treated by the Indian army the only thing you can do is stand up and fight. Islam does not say stay lying down and let them take what they want but Islam says defend your house and defend your family and defend your land... India took this land by force... helped by the British and others...

S3:

I fight because I have to. It is for my community and for my family and to let my family live in peace. Those who are innocent have perished so somebody must be brought to justice for this. After I heard talks about these things I had to do something.

S12

An Islamic state is necessary to correct the injustice that is currently being felt by Muslims and even non-Muslims as in history Islamic state was fair to all. Muslims were rulers in India for over 800 years in this time they were rich and prospered. Since the change corruption and riots and abuse have been here.

Recruitment: Generally at a young age the family and religious contacts opened up the possibility of making a conscious decision to take up 'the struggle'. Through informal contacts and attending talks, viewing literature and material pertaining to conflicts, the learnt of various groups that would welcome their active participation.

As S12 explained:

I joined JeM as I listened to a lot of M[aulana] Masood Azhar's talks and felt that they were the best group to take things forward. But I found out later on that they would say one thing and do another. Many JeM workers did not like the Pakistan ISI but I found they would often trade and work with operatives. This was the start of me finding out the double standards of JeM.

However, once involved in the organisation he was willing to do what he was told:

I wanted to go to Kashmir and India to fight for the army and change this horrible situation. But when I found out I was to be sent to India I did not know why or what to do.... I followed orders and did what I had to do. I did not understand them but those bigger than me said they would sort everything out.

Similarly S47 made clear that he had had other wishes:

I did not wish to go to India but wanted to fight in Kashmir and take back what was ours but I was told to go to India and this is where I went. I followed orders.

He had made a clear decision to join a *jihadi* group rather than the army:

I learned a lot about the atrocities that were happening in India and wanted to do something about it. My brother works in the army but I felt I could not do this as the army was corrupt sometimes. My cousin would get all the tapes and CDs about the different things going on in Kashmir, Afghanistan and other places. I became angry about what was happening and nobody was doing anything so I had to do something it was my Islamic duty, honour and privilege.

2) The Warrior

Although there is some overlap with the religious zealots this group see military valour as a significant component of their religious commitment. They are better educated and more informed than the zealots, wanting social honour and justice restored. The other significant aspect of these people, who see themselves as warriors, is that often they are involved in *jihad* activity over a long period of time, but tend to be recruited in their late teens or older.

These people believe they are defending themselves and fighting for justice rather than carrying out a religious mission. They do not seek any nationalist or religious solutions to the hurt they have suffered just a direct military action that will subdue those they consider their enemies.

The route into this form of violent action has the following stages:

1. Involvement in a community where there are militias accepted as part of daily life.
2. Low-level participation in the activities of armed groups in mid-teens.
3. Acceptance that there is a military enemy that needs to be defeated.
4. Absorption into the military activity that it is then difficult to disengage from.
5. However, this is a group for whom there is a possibility of disengagement.

These individuals make a conscious decision to take up struggle through informal contacts and being part of an environment that was suffused with military activity. For example S31:

I have been involved in many groups and I have had to work with many militants ... I do this because I stand up for what is right I saw the death and destruction which my brothers were feeling and I wanted to change this and bring justice. Since a young age I was carrying things for different fighters in my village while at school I used to carry literature around when I was 12-13 I was sent to prison for helping fighters carry guns around ... but I did not care as I thought that these people were doing the right thing for us and defending us I in my late teens started to meet and talk to different mujahidin groups ... I went to talks and became energised by this

This involvement may initially be more part of essentially criminal activity but a coercion to be part of it because of what he considers Islamic principles. For example S6

I had to work with the D-Company because I had committed myself and I had taken an oath and Islamicly I could not break this oath so I had to serve and obey.... But I was angry at the way in which many would get away with murder and Muslims would be left at the bottom of all things.

S6 shows how it is the excitement and pride in the military prowess that is an important component of the psychological benefit of involvement:

I do not fear death ... where is fear ... I had been given a gift from God that was to have raw courage... to do the things others could not do and stand. Many young people would come to meet me and say they wanted to join the group. I did not motivate them but I attracted these

people as I got the work done. I was determined to drive the army out and all those who sided with them.

These individuals have an informed understanding of how organisations work in part because they have had more exposure to other organisations through their legal activities:

S6

I earned my living through trading in the markets and I knew a lot of people who were struggling with things so I used to help them get things. I worked with many different people and often came into contact with people who knew what was happening to the Muslims in Kashmir and as a result of Babri Masjid and other massacres. D-Company was known by everyone and the mastermind behind things

They become an integrated part of militant activities. S31:

When I was in class IX during 1989, Militancy started. One day, a person came and asked me, would I like to join militancy and jihad. I was quite young and could not think deeply about all this. Without thinking seriously I joined Militancy in 1989. Thereafter I gave up education, which family members came to know later. In 1990 I was sent to Nepal and was kept there for 6 months. After 6 to 7 months after returning from Nepal they asked me to go for a special course. There were not many boys only few were there. After returning from there conflicts started here. We were asked to operate in Lal Chowk area during 91-92. On December 17th 1991, I was arrested. After my arrest I was in the Army camp, from where I fled and in 92 again I was caught. In Purat jail, I was there for three and half years, there after I was sent to Rajasthan and kept in Jodhpur jail. Having returned from there again I joined Militancy. In 94 end part and in 95 I was in HM. I was released in 1996. I was told to do the job again, when I was arrested no work could be done here. Once out of jail I became active during 1997. Then there was a disagreement with HM. Then I joined Harkatual-Ansar, who made me a Company Commander. Now I had different type of job. I kept things at home, which were also in the knowledge of my wife. My wife knew this, in 1997 married her. The reason was that she was having some weapons. She found me out for that. She was the sister of my friend and was keeping some arms and for this I married her.

But they do not idealise the armed struggle. As S31 put it:

Many of these organisations, militias are corrupt they are often full of hollow words they want people to do the running around but never themselves get their hands dirty.... I am one who will stand up and change things... I would not say I am completely religious but I am more observant than those who are the cause of me being here.

People were making money out of jihad... true jihad is that against an army but many of those in the militias were not concerned about that....they acted in their own interests.... in jail and other places you meet those involved in jihad and they motivate you to go further and praise you but since I have been in prison I started to read more and learned more so they could not motivate me blindly.

I entered jihad to drive out the Indian army from my area. They were committing atrocities.

When army soldiers were killed in the beginning I derived pleasure from this but when my understanding grew and I read the Quran then I became more aware.

An important aspect of this group, though, is that their worldly experience and less ideological bases to their actions does enable them to review their commitment to violence and opens up the possibility for disengagement. S31;

I became a militant when I was young. I saw nothing different and wanted to follow and bring change blindly I went with the things they told me and followed the things they wanted..... Motivated by a low knowledge I did not understand ... but now I do and I have read the Quran and other things.... I left their jihad when I learned the reality of the wrong things.

I had left and had given my resignation a month back. I went to the militant leader and told him that I was no longer involved. He said he knew it and asked me to wait and that he will talk to me in the evening, but he did not turn up. The people in police station kept me inside and told that they cannot release me. Then he came and told them to release me. But, after a while he changed his mind. I was not allowed to surrender. I asked him when you know about me, you accept the surrender. But, I was again arrested and I returned back to militancy.

3) **The Victim**

These are individuals who have no particular commitment to any mission or ideals, but who get caught up in violence because of the networks they have drifted into, often for financial gain but sometimes because they have been coerced. Typically it will be a friend or associate who has drawn them into the violence. This is more typically through organised crime rather than *jihadi* militants. These individuals will often be quite unaware of the larger programme of actions of which they are a part.

These individuals have a rather short pathway into violent action:

1. They are part of a network of sub-criminal activity.
2. They are paid or coerced to carry out some small part in an attack. This will be through friends or family whom they rely on or are responsible to.
3. Typically they are arrested soon after.
4. Because they have no particular commitment under appropriate circumstances they would disengage.

Respondents in the sample claim they were just fulfilling a request or task given to them by somebody they knew or trusted. They claim little or no knowledge of the greater plan and often that had been misled as to the real nature of what they were to do. Although the respondents consider themselves

religious they do not overtly want to establish an Islamic state or wish to impose Islamic law. Although the respondents do mention the different riots and other factors but they consider these outside of their understanding and not directly impacting on their lives.

Age range: Because come into contact with *jihadi* groups as part of their adult activities their initial contact ranged from late 20's to mid 50's.

Education: Within the sample there are those who have little educational background and others who have attained higher educational qualifications.

Family

Many were married and although described themselves as middle class would economically be described as poor. Those involved with the D-Company would most likely come from the outskirts of the city or its slum areas.

Occupation/ work:

Many of these respondents had worked in a semi skilled jobs (carpentry, engineering, masonry, shop assistants, etc.) but often low paid.

S4 (linked to the D-Company)

I belong to a middle class family, everyone at home was educated and we were living in a railway colony...I was good at studies and wanted to go further I studied at college... then after this I got involved in the construction business with my brother.

I made a lot of different friends while working with my brother. His friends became known to me and I used to get along with them.

Before the 1992 troubles work was good but after this it became difficult. Through my brother's friend and in particular (S6) I got some work.... S6 knew a lot of people... but because of my link with these people my name got mentioned by the police in the bombings in 1993.

The demolition of Babri Masjid was wrong and the riots were wrong... my friends used to converge on a shop behind our house in which they used to discuss things that were happening... my father did not stop me going there but did mention that we were in an isolated place.

Issues on religion and other matters of sharia did not become relevant to me then... but only when I came to prison they opened my eyes.... I was not interested in them earlier only through my association with (S6) and others (including brothers' contacts) was I implicated in all this. They used me and that's it... my life is at an end ...they cashed in on my simplicity and used my naivety. Never before has anyone been to the police or shamed my family in such away as I have.

S5 (linked to the D-Company)

I came into prison at the age of 31... I have spent 14 years in prison.... my family is a middle class family.

I gave up my studies at a young age because I could not concentrate I kept getting headaches...I am the least educated from my family... I worked then in different jobs mainly to do with mechanics and electricians. I also worked in shops and other places... my family was a good family so a friend of mine who trusted me asked me to run his laundry shop which I did. I also worked in Saudi Arabia for a while and then returned to work as a shop assistant with my cousin.

My involvement in this case is zero despite being in this jail for 14 years you can ask anyone.... my charge that I carried the scooter to the bazaar is wrong because I did not know what was in the scooter and I was just following what my cousin had asked me to do...

I had not attended any prior meetings of people nor was I aware of what was in the scooter. The scooter belonged to my cousin who is now dead... I did not know any of the people who did this... my cousin asked me to take the scooter as I was leaving and going that way.

I am more religious now than I was before.... but I was always good and kept away from bad things ... I prayed daily....

S42 (linked to the LeT)

A case was made against me that I offered support and shelter to militants in the area.... militants regularly came to the houses of people to take food and other things... I told the police that if they had been in my shoes they could also not refuseI have a business and by the grace of God it is doing well...

I had a good education and was wanting to continue but got caught up on this...they tried to frame me and say that I was the area commander of LeT.... which was not the case... My home environment was religious and strict.... everyone offers their prayers etc... Business in the area was not going well when militants attack services pull out even for a while tourists came but then militants attacked and the local people suffered ... the area I live in depends upon tourists a lot but with constant battles it is difficult...

Whatever is happening here in the name of jihad is not jihad... in these days jihad is only going on in Palestine, Chechnya and Iraq where America has subjugated unlawfully people.

I had doubts about the claim that militants were going to liberate Kashmir I knew they were mere slogans. Kashmir is the second most corrupt state after Bihar. There is no place here you can get work done without bribes.

Militants used to come in and out all the time in our area.... they used to demand money and other things this situation continued until 1999 between this and 2003 we had a little peace but thereafter militants came back again.

Kashmir people are suffering a lot ... neither Pakistan nor India care. JKLF committed atrocities, all the militants are as trouble makers...

4) **The Political Intellectual**

These are typically the leaders of any attacks involved in the planning stages and theoretical discussions about activities of military groups. They often have higher levels of education and have possibly been a professional or the manager of a business. Within the sample the main process of recruitment was through educational establishments, business contacts and working environments. They are very religious, articulate and understand the history of Islam and its culture. These individuals are politically aware and use political examples of how things have not worked. They question state and government processes. They are recruited through educational establishments or working environments, but always through direct contact with other like-minded individuals.

They see themselves as intellectuals who are acting on specific interpretations of the Quran. The difference from the zealots is that their focus is on the need for the achievement of political solutions as a result of violent action.

Age range: within the sample the age at which individuals start to discuss and debate issues is in the late teenage years, leading into college.

Family: Upper middle-class families, in some cases quite affluent.

S9:

I come from a middle class family... my grandfather served in the British army... I studied commerce and then later did my masters in computer applications. ... I was at one point teaching army officers now I'm in jail... I was always focused on my studies...

My family were very religious and the reading of the Quran took place regularly.

The difference between me and others is that I'm not a Muslim merely by birth but a Muslim by knowledge and conviction.

My friends circle was good they were doctors, engineers and people engaged in research and we used to discuss and talk about the Quran and its commentaries.

Jihad has two aspects to it first is an internal aspect and second external. If you live in a state of Dar Al-kufr that is a state which prevents you from offering namaz then you have to struggle against this and this is jihad

It is justified to liberate Muslim land ... in fact it is compulsory for every Muslim. Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan must fight jihad ...

I have acquired my knowledge through reading and talking to others ... 1992 (Babri Masjid destruction) was a betrayal by the government... when S10 got out of jail we started thinking about how we could help Muslims who were in jail ... we wanted to give them legal aid.. We wanted educated people to come forward and help....

S21

Even if somebody says he will make me the president of America, I will not leave Kashmir... this is the psychology of the Kashmiri ... I have grown up in this atmosphere ... Kashmir is central to who I am...

In 1989 or 1990 I passed matriculation ... at that time the Kashmir movement started in my teens..... in college there were seminars and talks ... I had no idea of what was going on but started to become more aware... I saw a bad situation ... even today I feel frightened remembering those days... a young girl was raped.... a camp had been opened ... a young girl is taken for questioning ... she is then rapedthis is different from an individual committing a rape ... there is a problem when the state machinery is involved in such repression....

Only in jail did I start to pray regularly before then I was religious but not that much I was working in a major multi-national company until I was arrested ... during this time ... I was awarded many certificates by the company for my successes there... these were my achievements I was happy with my family and everything ...

I attended seminars and talks... I started to develop my Islamic knowledge and expand my mind ... during this time period militants openly collected and it was not hard to recognise them ... Militancy was common ... many of my friends adopted this and went to Pakistan to train...

After 2001 things change. The trust between Pakistan and Kashmir changed... After the bomb blasts my number was found in some satellite phone of the militant and this is how I was connected to it ... I was not involved and I did not belong to any movement or militia... There are no courts for Muslims... justice is not here for the Kashmir Muslims... I know it for certain that no court will give us justice ... the intelligence agencies matter ... we are physically and mentally harassed in custody...

In 1949 raja Hari Singh stepped down and Kashmir was annexed to India... in a single day over 150 000 Muslims were killed... even if Muslims are 96% of Kashmir they never killed Hindus.... Hari Singh did not want to live after that and left everything to Karan Singh.... I love politicians like Jagmohan when he was governor of Kashmir...

Actually it started in 1989... when the war had ended in Afghanistan ... the mujahedeen had won the battle... so our boys felt encouraged by this ... mujahedeen who had fought for 20 long years ... a super power like Russia had been humiliated ... then the mujahedeen came to Kashmir... the force the weaponsstarted coming ... India has over 800 000 personnel in Kashmir The Muslims who boasted Indianess or supported Indian in these times were shown their true fate when POTA came into effect.... they were arrested ... India never arrested any of those involved in the Gujarat massacre ... Nothing has happened to those people...

Automatically people became ready to fight India at this stage.... Kashmir never belonged to India ... in this time... I saw young boys been taken by the army beaten and then stripped naked.... some became disabled or became ill with internal diseases... the father of one boy argued with the soldiers ... they shot his son in front of him and others ...

The militancy in Kashmir was crushed not by India but by Pakistan ... Musharraf knew many militia had political goals as well so he stopped them...

When atrocities happen then you must stand up ... should I wait until atrocities hits me personally or should I wait until I am raped ... Before it happens to me I have to fight... what did India gain from the destruction of the Babri Masjids?... Babur was not an outsider ... Babur came from India ... he did not take anything from India like the British.

Atrocities started first before militancy ... in 1989 people wanted to change the government through elections they have that right ... then Pakistan nor India wanted to change government so what option was left for the Kashmiri people.

The issue in Kashmir is very complex but it is a political issue but there will always be jihadist elements in it.... fighting jihad will be difficult for India as how can you fight somebody who is willing to die... they know that their life after death is more important...

Case Study: THE PATHWAY TO VIOLENCE OF Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab

During the course of the current project a violent attack took place in Mumbai. One of the ten attackers survived and was eventually willing to give a full account of himself and his pathway to the attack. Because the research was active in India at the time it was possible to obtain a full account of his confessions and some background information. It thus usefully illustrates in one case the general trends that have been identified from the 49 interviews that have been summarised.

Incident

On 26 Nov 2008 Mumbai, India's commercial capital, was raided by five pairs of terrorists belonging to the Pakistan-based militant *jihadi* group Lashkar-e-Taiba, who also call themselves Jama'at-ud-Da'wah. The attackers, young men in their early twenties, displayed combat skills reminiscent of Commandoes deployed by conventional Special Forces. 173 persons were killed in the incident including 19 from the security forces. Hemant Karkare, Head of the Mumbai Anti-terrorist Squad died in the attack. The unfolding hostage drama, lasting sixty hours, was brought to an end by India's elite National Security Guards through successful building interventions. Nine of the ten terrorists were killed and one terrorist, namely, Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab was caught alive.

Source of data

In most Fidayeen or suicide attacks the attackers are dead. However, in case of the 26/11 attacks, one of the attackers survived, whose life story presents a concrete example of pathways in militant *jihad* as well as an insight into the mental constructs of the *jihadi* terrorists.

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 stipulates that a confession recorded by the police is inadmissible in evidence. We have relied primarily on five sources of data to understand Kasab's life story and mental constructs.

- While in Police custody Kasab expressed a desire to make a confessional statement. So, he was produced before a Magistrate for recording of a confessional statement under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code of India, 1973. Before recording a confessional statement under the Indian laws a Magistrate has the duty to make sure that there is no shadow of the police and no pressure or inducement. The accused is cautioned that any such statement will be used against him during trial and a conviction can be awarded.
- The Magistrate is also expected to give a reasonable amount of time for the accused for cool reflection. In case of Kasab the Magistrate gave two days to Kasab to think over his decision to confess and also repeated the cautions a second time when he was produced before her after the end of the two days. But Kasab insisted on making a confessional statement and therefore, the Magistrate after ensuring that it was a voluntary statement decided to go ahead with recording of the confession in a question-answer form as is the court tradition in India.
- It took the Magistrate two days, i.e., 20 and 21 Feb 2009 to record the statement. Kasab gave a detailed account of his life story as well as his role in the incident. The statement is in Hindi and has been produced in the court during trial and therefore, it is a public document available with to court as well as the defence. We have translated the document into English and quoted wherever relevant.
- In July 2009 during trial Kasab ignored the advice from his legal counsel and pleaded guilty in the open court after trial in the case had commenced and demanded that trial be ended and he be punished. The prosecution opposed any end to trial, but requested the court to record the plea.

After lengthy legal arguments the trying judge decided to record the guilty plea of the accused and to carry on with the trial since there were other accused facing trial and since the entire evidence should be brought on record to understand the wider picture.

- The plea was recorded by the Judge in a statement form on 20 July 2009 in English in the presence of the defence attorney. In large parts Kasab confirmed his earlier confessional statement recorded by the Magistrate on 20 and 21 Feb 09, though modified some parts relating to legal liability. But, the life story account given in both statements are mostly the same.
- The terrorists carried mobile telephones which they activated once they reached Mumbai shores. The Indian Police managed to intercept these telephones that captured the terrorists and their handlers in Pakistan in their own words. Six of these intercepts, exhibited in the court, have been considered by us. These intercepts give an unprecedented insight into the minds of the terrorists and their relationship with the top leadership of the Lashkar-e-Taiba handling the operation.
- The reaction of Kasab during trial has been widely covered in the media. He seemed to enjoy the limelight and has not wasted any opportunity in making demands of the authorities each time.
- Discussion have also been drawn on with Inspector Ramesh Mahale, Chief Investigating Officer of the Case, Joint Commissioner of Police Rakesh Maria, the head of the Mumbai Crime Branch that investigated the case and Sadanand Date, Additional Commissioner of Police who was injured in the grenade attack during exchange of fire with the terrorists in Cama Hospital.

Kasab's pathway to Militant Jihad

Kasab was born in village Faridkote, Tahasil- Dipalpur, in the District of Okara in the state of Punjab, Pakistan in 1987. He dropped out of school in 2000 after studying up to class IV and started working as a daily labourer as desired by his father. In 2001 he accompanied his father and uncle to the city of Lahore. For a year he was working in a tent house on the advice of his father. In 2005 his father and uncle returned to their village and so Kasab was living alone in Lahore, though he was in touch with his family. During a visit to his village he had a fight with his father since the latter refused to buy a particular clothe that Kasab wanted to buy. His father thought the clothe was too expensive in view of Kasab's low income. After this incident Kasab ran away from home and started living in an Islamic charitable institution in Lahore called Ali Hazuri Dargha that offers free food to poor children.

While living in the charitable institution Kasab developed friendship with a boy by the name Mujjafar. Kasab was unhappy to be poor and to be earning so little. Mujaffar suggested that they commit one major robbery in the house of a rich person and get rid of poverty for all times to come. They located a Bungalow, but realized that they needed a gun to be able to commit the robbery successfully. During 'Bakri Id' they saw Mujahedeens of Lashkar-e-Taiba carrying a procession with sacrificed goat skins and thought that they should approach the Mujahedeens for a Gun as well as training so that they could commit the robbery. They were given the address of the Lashkar-e-Taiba office by a Maulvi (Islamic scholar) and they reached the office and declared that they

wanted to be *jihadis*. They were asked to report the next day for training. Kasab underwent a series of trainings before he was chosen for the Mumbai operation. He had to successfully complete each level of training before being selected for higher training.

- *1st Phase: Daura-e-sofa or Philosophical Training*

During the 29 days of training Kasab was converted from Sunni Islam to Ahle Hadith, which is a more radical and literalist interpretation of Islam that considers any interpretation of Islam, beyond the literal words of the Holy Quran and the Hadith as illegitimate. He was told about the religious justification for *jihad* and told that fighting against India because of atrocities committed by the latter in Kashmir and other parts of India is the duty of a true Muslim. He was assured that if he dies in the process he will most definitely be rewarded by God in the afterlife with paradise.

- *2nd Phase: Daura-e-Aam or General Training*

The General Training of 21 days was the first round of basic military training that Kasab received. He attended classes in Physical Training; running and exercises, weapon handling: like using a Kalashnikov Automatic Rifle and Pistols and tactical lessons.

- *3rd Phase: Khidmat or Community Service*

After the general training recruits are allowed to return home till they are called on duty or alternatively they can serve the Mujahedeen. Kasab decided to continue in the training camp to carry out community service for three months. As part of Khidmat, Kasab along with other volunteers prepared and served food for new Mujaheds undergoing training. Kasab was then selected for Special Training in view of his good performance in the General Training and his commitment for *iihad*.

- *4th Phase: Daura-e-Khas or Special Training*

Kasab describes the Special Training as follows:

“During this 2½ months training, we became hard core *jihadis*. We were taught on Namaz, Quran and Muslim Laws, etc. In addition, we were also trained regarding use of various types of Rifles, Pistol, Firing, Rocket Launchers, and Hand Grenades. Besides, we were also trained in the use of Satellite phone, G.P.S. System, Map reading and climbing hills with empty stomach by carrying weight, etc.” .

The training was similar to Commando Training imparted by Special Forces. The endurance training included running 15 km non-stop, climbing hills with rucksacks and timed firing. Since Kasab was found to be good he was given a new name called ‘Abu Mujahed’ and selected for Fidayeen attacks. He was now among the elite within the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

- *5th Phase: Doura-e-Rewat or Intelligence Training*

During the one month’s training programme Kasab says:

“We were taught about ‘operation of Intelligence Agency. In this training we learnt how to collect information about the targeted person, watch his movement, follow him and if, someone, follows you, then how to mislead him, for example, if someone follows you in a vehicle, then you have to use right side indicator and immediately turn left. Then you will come to know that someone is following you. While on a mission, you may befool a person by giving false identity without disclosing your own identity.”

- *6th Phase: High Sea Training*

Kasab and 12 others were taken to the sea and given marine training for three/four days in a small ship. During the training they were taught about navigation when at sea using GPS, judging depth of sea and dealing with rough weather. They were also told how to disguise themselves as fishermen by using a fish nets in order to deceive the enemy’s navy.

- *Other Training*

Other training included explosive and demolition training and participation in simulation exercises involving timed firing.

Kasab says that he was like a 'Keeda' a tiny unwanted creature, when he landed on the doorstep of the *jihadis* in search of a gun to commit a robbery. But, the *jihadi* 'assembly line' had turned Kasab into a Fidayeen fighter. He had joined a peer group competing against each other in a training programme and felt a sense of achievement when he did better than his peers. Kasab describes a particular event when a character he describes as 'Major General Shab' visited the camp and asked for targets to be put for a firing test among ten of the Mujaheds. One of the trainees, named Imran Babar put did poorly. So, 'Amir Hafiz Sayeed severely admonished Imran Babbar'.

"Major General Saheb went near the target and enquired who fired at target No. 4. I said, I did. Major General Sahab said 'you have destroyed the target completely'. We were all delighted. He asked the rest to destroy the target with fewer rounds. Pointing towards me, he told that "firing should be like this Mujaheddeen".p.19

Kasab was clearly happy to undergo the training and viewed successful completion of such a tough training as an accomplishment. "10 Mujaheds left the training camp because of the very tough training." He also valued the praise of his trainers and staying ahead of others in the peer group during tests. It all seemed to have given him a sense of purpose from living an insignificant life. He was happy to be selected from a large group of peers to be a Fidayeen fighter. It gave him a sense of accomplishment.

The role played by the senior members of the organization in directing the Mumbai Operation is also clear from the statements of Kasab as well as the telephone intercepts. The entire operation was meticulously planned and executed and every image that it gives out to the world shaped carefully. Kasab and his comrades complied with all directions from their handlers voluntarily.

During the *Daura-e-Sofa* Kasab and others were told that the fight in Kashmire since the last 15 years has not liberated Kashmir. Therefore the Indian mainland and her cities had to be attacked to weaken India. Mumbai was attacked because "Bombay is the finance Capital of Hindustan. Therefore, we want to attack Bombay. You Mujahiddins are well trained regarding sea routes. We will attack Bombay through sea route."

"You people have to attack V.T. [Victoria Terminus] Station, Malabar Hill, Taj Hotel at Kolaba, Leopold Hotel, Oberoi Hotel and Israeli-inhabited Nariman House by firing with Kalashnikovs and throwing Hand Grenades. While firing, you have to target Americans, British and Israelis and kill them, because those people have tortured Muslims. While firing on V.T. Station there might be a huge crowd, you shall have to indiscriminately fire without discriminating who is Hindu or Muslim. But while firing in the hotel, you should keep in mind that no Muslim is killed."... "plant RDX Bombs at suitable places nearer to target points. After your attack there will be traffic congestion and some policemen and public will try to help the injured. The bomb blast will target these policemen and public."

The attackers were divided into five 'buddy' pairs and briefed using Google maps and a reconnaissance video and hand-made sketch maps regarding the role each was to play.

“On entering the hall, we saw 2/3 TVs, Zarar Shah told us this is the control room of Media Wing. We were shown the target places and routes on a big screen. At that time Zarar Shah showed me and Ismail Khan the CDs of V.T.S. and Malbar Hill. While showing the CDs, Zarar Shah was explaining all details regarding the routes towards V.T.S. and Malbar Hill. Kafa showed us the route map from Badhwar Park to V.T.S. and from V.T.S. to Malbar Hill through Google web site on a Laptop. At the same time, Kafa showed us some hand-drawn maps and told us that Sawauddin Ahmed and Fahim Ansari of Hindustan have sent us those maps. With the help of these maps, you can easily reach those places where you are to attack.”

The briefing of the attackers was continued even during the attack proper. At the Nariman House the terrorists held Israeli citizens including Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg and his wife Rivakah Holtzberg. Israel opened negotiations with the terrorists who were demanding the release of the lone terrorist captured alive, who they thought was Abu Ismail, the leader of the ten member team, though it was in fact Ajmal Kasab, one of the most junior members of the team who had been captured. After each round of negotiation the Pakistani handlers took stock of the situation and directed the whole process. The handler is heard asking the attackers not to lose tactical position in the process of negotiation, to keep the magazines always loaded and to keep throwing grenades and keep firing in order to keep the pressure on the negotiators. In fact, the handler was watching live coverage of the news and asking for grenades to be thrown in particular directions. The intercepts make it clear that the handlers sitting in Pakistan had full control over the operation at all stages.

The attackers were given identity cards to establish that they were Indians and to make demands in the name of an organization called ‘Mujahedeen Hyderabad Deccan.’ “In this way we can terrorize Hindustan by identifying ourselves as Indian Muslims with large number of followers.” In fact, in a recorded intercept the handlers from Pakistan can be heard asking for the exact manner in which the demands are to be put forth through the media, including reading of a *jihadi* poem, which was dictated over the phone. The poem says

*“ Yeh Saach hain Ki Andheronka tashaluk hai Magar
Samme bujhne na denge julmonki ibanonmain
Andhiyan Julmon tasadatki bahot tej sahi
Hamhin o deephain jinneh jalna hai tufano me”*

The poem roughly translates into English as:

*It is true that there is domination of darkness
We will not allow the light to extinguish because of atrocities
The storm of atrocities is strong
We are the candles who have to burn in the storm.”*

The attacker is being advised not to give away any positional details to the media, to take a glass of water and then deliver the message in an even and controlled voice and to say that what the world has seen is a ‘trailer’. He is being advised that if the take is not good then he should disconnect and go for a second take. But, the message needs to be delivered with clarity and in a dramatic fashion for the sake of all the Mujahedeen and because it will be played for days in media channels across the globe.

During the hostage negotiation the Israeli negotiator, who identifies himself as Levi, tries to generate empathy by asking the hostage taker about the latter's well being, which is replied to inform the negotiator that he and others were fine. During a subsequent negotiation the Urdu translator used by the Israelis tries to bring in Islam to draw the attention of the attacker about the message of Islam. The hostage taker turns back and advises the translator to think how the latter is going to explain his deeds on the day of the final judgment. The idea that in such a hostage situation there may be some scope to generate empathy and then enter into reasoned discussion is proved not to have any effect. The intercepts show that the activities were being conducted in a cold and calculated manner and the terrorists even took turns to take naps between activities. There is no apparent panic and the individuals appear to be very clear headed in what they were doing.

Before embarking on the operation all the ten attackers took baths, changed into new clothes, offered prayers, shared sweets, hugged and assured each other that they will reunite in heaven. The martyrdom ritual indicates the individual motivation; a kind of selfish objective of attaining martyrdom and getting rewarded with paradise. In the intercepts the individual says, "Please request elders to pray for us. That we are not captured by the enemy and we attain martyrdom". Even after being hit by a bullet the individual is asking for prayers to 'accept the martyrdom' and dies with the assurance and comfort of martyrdom.

There is an element of stress and fear as can be inferred from the intercepts, but then the attacker initiates a discussion on martyrdom and as soon as there is discussion over martyrdom the attacker improves his mood, feels reassured and the stress is mitigated. So, in the entire discussion over the strategic goal and broader political objectives, there are individuals with clear ambition for a better life in the life hereafter. They are convinced that there is no harm in achieving martyrdom by killing people. Kasab's only regret is that he was denied martyrdom. In explaining his reasons for confessing, Kasab told the magistrate that "I want to give a confessional statement; so that others are inspired by my acts to become Fidayeens like me".

Is Kasab's pathway Unique?

There are three aspects to Kasab's radicalization pathway.

Firstly, Kasab's socio-economic background. He dropped out of school at a young age to add to family income. It is poverty and want that drove him out of home onto the life of a street urchin living on free food offered by an Islamic charity. Like other teen-aged boys living on the street who take to petty crimes, Kasab also planned a robbery.

The desire to come out of poverty was so strong that Kasab during his initial interview with the police from the hospital bed had said that the organization had assured him money would be paid to his father; enough money to look after the needs of his brother and the marriage of his two sisters. But in the confessional statements he did not repeat this part.

Kasab's description of his life as that of a keeda, a tiny unwanted creature, explains his self image and the manner in which an ideology created a generativity script that helped him to get rid of the self image of a keeda and to create a sense of significance. Further, there is a global political and strategic context that was presented to Kasab to define his role as a warrior fighting to get rid of injustice on fellow Muslims.

When captured he has not regretted his role and has been unrepentant. He first demanded biryani and spicy food and then basmati rice and refused to eat unless his demands were met. He has demanded flavoured tooth paste and perfumed deodorant. When the defence lawyer wanted to stop him from making a guilty plea, he threatened to change his lawyer.

On 10 June 2009 the Judge had to warn him of action over his misbehaviour towards jail officials. He laughed and joked and smirked during the course of the trial. He has made it clear that he has done what he had to and does not regret any bit of it. He possibly views himself as a war hero, who had carried out a successful operation against the enemy and proved his worth to people, who matter to him.

Kasab viewed his main reward as martyrdom and he participated in the operation with the knowledge, belief and conviction that he was fighting a *jihad* that would lead to paradise after death.

Kasab's life story also shows the role played by the terror network in the radicalization process. Firstly, the terror network was easily accessible. The terrorist group had an open office in a known address that young boys had no difficulty in finding out. Kasab said in his guilty plea that while in search of a weapon to commit a robbery:

“I pointed to Mujaffar that I had seen Mujahiddins in the market yesterday and that we could get training from them. He agreed. At that time Mujahiddins were not in the market. We tried to search for them. I knew the description of Mujahiddins. I knew that they had long beard and long hair... One of the persons (Banda) told us that the persons who were collecting skins were Mujahiddins. He told us that office of Mujahiddin were situated in 6th gulli (lane) in Raza Bazaar”.

The normal perception of a terror organisation is that it is secret. But, in Pakistani Punjab Lashkar-e-Taiba's office was located by illiterate street children without any difficulty and thereafter Kasab underwent training in six phases without any interference by any state actor like police or intelligence agencies in Pakistan. LeT provided Kasab with a new that answered his psychological needs. He enjoyed the training, most of it outdoors, and viewed his success in the training as an accomplishment. He was very happy that he was such a good marksman that valued authority figure like 'Major General Sahab' praised him before his peers whereas those not good at firing were admonished.

For its part the terror network had fully utilized Kasab's search for significance and recognized his talents. He was happy to be good at some skills and to be praised as better than others in the peer group. Significance and recognition gave a new purpose in life, whose logical extension was to become a Fidayeen fighter to carry out a daring commando raid on an Indian city as desired by the authority figures. LeT had fully exploited Kasab's search for adventure, thrill and significance.

The top leaders of Lashkar-e-Taibahad planned the operation in meticulous detail. They had made a training need assessment and provided all the relevant training. The required inventory for the operation was carefully estimated and provided. Each of the attackers carried one automatic Kalashnikov assault rifle and one pistol with spare magazines and

ammunitions, 8-10 Hand Grenades. The arms, ammunitions and explosives were enough to kill many more than were actually killed. Besides, they carried one GPS set and mobile telephone, dry fruits etc.

The review of the targets was carried out with military precision. The briefing of the foot soldiers was diligent. Police Officers handling the operation at the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, for example, found that the terrorists knew the exact suites that had two or three doors and so they did not enter any room that had a single door. Lashkar-e-Taiba handlers had also provided mobile telephone, satellite terminals and Voice-over-Internet- Protocol (Callphonex, a VoIP service provider) telephones so that communication between the controllers and the foot soldiers was uninterrupted and fail-proof.

The operations were carefully planned and controlled at all stages from Pakistan. The handler can be heard instructing, “You are in the most important target, the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel. TV is giving maximum coverage to Taj. You have to sacrifice your life for the success of this operation”. Even after the attacker is hit by a bullet the handler who was repeatedly saying, ‘you must not be caught alive’ is heard comforting the foot soldier to death with the promise of martyrdom. It was clear that the handlers were authority figures that Kasab and his friends willingly accepted and did not see any manipulation that may be involved in the relationship.

If terrorist organizations function as efficiently without any disruption by the state actors and there are individuals like Kasab then radicalization looks like a rather straightforward process. But, we know that many persons from a descent family background, well educated have also joined *jihad*. Also that a great many more people in a similar situation to Kasab do not turn to violence. There are therefore still some open questions about exactly what psychological processes lead one person down this path but not others.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The core implication of the interviews and of the case study is that people become involved in terrorism because of the social milieu in which they participate. No individual in the sample became aware of the need for violent aggression on their own. They were always part of a group or community. Therefore all processes that seek to reduce terrorism must address the groups and communities that foster it. No individualistic approach will have much success. Although the caveat needs to be stated that it would seem that some individuals are more vulnerable to social pressures than others. The next phase of this study will explore that secondary issue more thoroughly.

One factor that emerged from the interviews and the case study is that many of those involved not only would happily die for Islam but wished that they had died. Therefore the distinction between suicide bombers and the other *jihadis* is not as clear as might be assumed. These individuals made clear over and over again that they believed they would go to paradise for carrying out their attacks.

Many people who take up violence in the name of Islam are not very intelligent or highly educated. Their views on the need for *jihad* are therefore strongly influenced by fluent, charismatic leaders. Importantly, it is unlikely that their attitudes will change by the force of any sort of intellectual argument, or the presentation of facts. They have been fed many examples of atrocities against Muslims and have been lead to believe that they have a duty to defend their co-religionists.

There is a need to distinguish between these zealots, for whom the armed struggle is a profoundly religious action and those for whom it is a pragmatic solution to the suffering they perceive. The former, who are often less intelligent and well-educated, are less open to being able to disengage from violence than the latter. The pragmatists can be persuaded to give up violence if they can see a safe route out of the groups to which they belong. They will follow those routes if they recognise that the leaders of violent action are not the paragons they claim to be.

Therefore the presentation of any policies needs be alert to the differences between these rather different groups. The former may be encouraged to disengage if religious leaders whom they trust give them a different interpretation of the Quran. The latter can be persuaded by information about the corruption of their leadership and the confusion of the aims of their groups.

The interviews and background information shows that the various groups that may call themselves *jihadi* often to not agree with each other over processes or objectives. The opportunities for encouraging disputes between the different groupings would seem to be very great, but is likely to be more effective if it challenges the reputations of key individuals rather than in terms of ideological polemic.

It should also be recognised that once terrorism has a foothold in a community it can readily develop to be become a significant part of how that community operates. It can easily become a magnet for organised crime. Militant activity and organised crime can feed on each other. Therefore the relationship between police and counter-insurgency activities should be as strong as possible.

Countering the psychological precursors to terrorism

At the heart of any attempts to undermine the central psychological processes that feed terrorism has to be to break-down the simple division between the group the terrorist identifies with and the rest. So many commentators draw attention to this issue of social identity that it is remarkable that politicians and educators are not more robust in their overt attempts to undermine any simple-minded dichotomy between say, the ‘faithful’ and the ‘infidel’. Indeed there are so many processes that support the distinction espoused by terrorists between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that without a major campaign to erode its distinctions the divisions are likely to become stronger and simpler.

What major public figures seem to underestimate is that the in-group/out-group division can all too readily be the skeleton which can be fleshed out with a heroic narrative enlivened by justifications for violence. Anyone who has seen the anodyne Danish cartoons of the Prophet that have been cited as the cause for violence and bloodshed around the globe will immediately realise that the cartoons themselves were of far less importance than the narrative in which they were embedded that presents ‘The West’ insulting ‘Islam’ and the importance of revenge against such insults.

The human process of categorisation is so fundamental that we are usually not aware that we are doing it. This lack of awareness is particularly dangerous when the categories are arbitrary and naïve. In the current climate there is a remarkably simple-minded notion of ‘ethnicity’ that colours far too many

debates. As Marks (2002) amongst many others has made exceptionally clear, there is no biological basis to race and even less to any notion of ‘ethnic’ group. In broad terms, the closer together any two people live the more likely are they to share genetic material. So there will be some similarities within any population, but despite the superficial distinctions of skin colour or nose shape the major differences between people are in their attitudes and culture, not in their biology.

Any attempts to define individuals in terms of single characteristics, be it religion, country of birth, ‘ethnicity’, ‘race’ or even football team supported, rather than any of the many other ways they can be identified serves to foster the basis for the Samson syndrome (Canter 2006). Education that unpacks the many different overlapping narratives that characterise human history has to be at the forefront in the fight against terrorism. Intending terrorists need to be aware that we are not all Philistines.

Disengagement

Part of the process of disengagement from terrorism, then, is to enrich the understanding of all those involved in the complexities of identity. But the intricacies of the social processes in which any individual is embedded make this more difficult. The interviews reveal the difficulties of disengagement for people whose whole life and sub-culture have embraced terrorism. Not only is it coercion that can keep them involved, but it is difficult for them to leave the social group in which they have become embedded as terrorists. Any attempts at disengagement, as with encouraging people to give up other criminal activity needs to deal with the social psychological process that brought people into terrorist acts initially.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

It has to be understood that there are many routes into terrorism but that they are all based in communities that support this activity. Therefore, as has been shown in many other attempts to deal with insurgents the community that breeds them has to be turned away from this support. In doing that the role of organised crime and other sub-criminal activity has to be fully appreciated.

The foot soldiers involved often do not have a larger understanding of the geo-political issues. They are driven by their own experiences and what others have told them. Cultural and psychological operations therefore have to go hand in hand with any military offensive.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERROGATION OF INSURGENTS

This study does show that if approached in the right way *jihadis* will talk about their lives. They do want to talk about what they usually think of as their great deeds. However, interviewers would benefit from being aware of the different pathways into terrorism and the different underlying motivations they imply. Such awareness would encourage very different interview strategies.

REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The analyses so far have revealed a considerable amount about those involved in jihad, but a closer examination of their conceptual systems would be of great value. This will be possible by considering

their construct systems on the basis of the repertory grid material that is available. This will form the basis of phase 2 of this project.

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Appendix I : GROUPS AND MOVEMENTS

The interviews and search through related background information allowed the development of summary accounts of the major terrorist groups, movements and organisations to which the interviewees belonged. This provides important insights into the nature of these groups and how they provide a framework for the pathways into terrorism.

The following appendix therefore gives a very brief history of the groups and other related information. However it should be borne in mind that each group has a particular history and many of the groups have splintered off into several smaller factions, often based upon ethnic, village, tribal and even socio-economic lines. They are a changing mixture of allegiances, often battling with each other. Therefore the full subtleties of the similarities and differences between these groups are not elucidated in these brief notes. Furthermore, as these are banned, illegal organisations information has to be gleaned from various sources that may not be entirely trustworthy or up to date, so the information must be treated with caution.

Organisational affiliation:

The following table indicates the organisations that interviewees were established as belonging to, either through their own admission or on the basis of background information.

		Number	Percent
AJ	Al Jihad	1	2.0
D-Coy	Dawood Gang	5	10.2
HM	Hizbul Mujahideen	7	14.3
HuA	Harkat ul Ansar	4	8.2
JeM	Jaish e Mohammad	7	14.3
JKLF	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front	5	10.2
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba	15	30.6
MJF	Muslim Janbaz Force	1	2.0
SIMI	Student Islamic Movement of India	2	4.1
TEJ	Tehrik-e-Jihad	1	2.0
Unknown	Not known	1	2.0
Total		49	100.0

LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA / LASHKAR-E-TOIBA (LET) (Army of Religiousness/ The Righteous / Purity)

Date Founded: 1989/1990

Principle Area of Operation:

Afghanistan, Jammu, Kashmir & Pakistan; Active operations in India.

Major Aims:

Cessation of Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control.

Re-establishment of an Muslim/ Islamic governing system over South East Asia

Principle Area of Recruitment:

Cross section of supporters in Pakistan and Middle East. Recruitment may occur at talks and spiritual gatherings in and across these countries. Range of professional young, working class or middle class individuals; Idealists.

General Characteristics:

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI)—a Sunni anti-US missionary organization formed in 1989. The LeT has been involved in a large number of attacks in India and is by far the most dangerous terrorist organisation. The group consists of Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Indians and has its bases in India, Indonesia, Australia and even Europe and US. It is on the US list of banned terrorist organisations. Osama Bin Laden had funded MDI. Top Al-Qaeda leader and Bin Laden's deputy Abu Zubeida was arrested in 2002 in Faisalabad from a safe house maintained by

LeT was the culmination of several militias joining forces during the soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Members have allegedly carried out attacks on Pakistani and Indian soil targeting non-military areas to show their strength and opposition to the political processes. Opposed to the ISI however conflicting information suggests that the group has been supported by the ISI. Mainly Sunni Muslim group alleged to have links with 'radical wahabi' thinkers in the Middle East. Has been allegedly been linked to recent attacks in India as well as in Bangladesh and Pakistan.

THE STUDENTS ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF INDIA (SIMI)

Date Founded: 1977

Principle Area of Operation:

India.

Major Aims:

Advocates the liberation of India by Muslims through conversion and establishment of a core Islamic seminary structure throughout India.

Principle Area of Recruitment:

Universities, colleges and educated elite and middle class.

General Characteristics:

This was the student wing of the Jamiat i-Islami Hind (Islamic party of India), which after disagreement with its student office bearers abandoned it in 1981. The group mainly advocated a non-violent approach by setting up social and educational programs which would convert indigenous Hindus. Having separated from the main political party, members of the movement started to disagree on the direction of the group and started to splinter. Members allegedly recruited and supported various militias and organisations operating in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

SIMI is a banned Islamist fundamentalist organization, which advocates the 'liberation of India' by converting it to an Islamic land. The SIMI is an organisation of young extremist students which has declared Jihad against India, the aim of which is to establish Dar-ul-Islam (Land of Islam) by either forcefully converting everyone to Islam or by violence. The organisation was formed at Aligarh in the State of Uttar Pradesh on April 25, 1977. Mohammad Ahmadullah Siddiqi, Professor of Journalism and Public Relations at the Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois, was the founding President of the movement. It originally emerged as an offshoot of the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind. The activists of SIMI have been involved in attacks on public transport and other civilian targets.

THE HARKAT UL-ANSAR (HUA)

HuA was formed by the merger of two Pakistani groups, Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami and Harkat ul-Mujahedin, and led by Maulana Saadatullah Khan. The merger of these two political groups and its transformation into a militant group came about as part of the Afghan jihad. About 60 per cent of its estimated 1000 strong cadre were Pakistanis and Afghans. The Harkat-ul-Ansar was termed a terrorist organization by the US due to its association with the exiled Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden in 1997. To avoid the repercussions of the US ban, the group was recast as the Harkat ul-Mujahideen in 1998. Based in Muzaffarabad, capital of Pakistan controlled Kashmir, the Harkat ul-Ansar has participated in insurgent and terrorist operations in Kashmir, Myanmar, Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kashmir, they carried out several operations against Indian troops besides attacks on civilian targets. Now the organisation is no longer in existence with some cadres reportedly joining LeT and the rest forming Jaish e Mohammad (JeM) under Maulana Masud Azhar.

JAISH E MOHAMMAD (JEM) – (Followers/ devotees or Army of Muhammad)

Date Founded: 1999/2000

Principle Area of Operation:

Jammu & Kashmir; Afghanistan (bases in Pakistan)

Major Aims:

Splinter group from the HM same aims as the HM. However backs the only view that Jammu & Kashmir should be part of Pakistan and not independent.

Principle Area of Recruitment:

Cross section of supporters in India, Pakistan and Middle East. Recruitment may occur at talks and spiritual gatherings in and across Pakistan and Kashmir from working class and middle class young idealists.

General Characteristics:

JeM was formed by Maulana Masud Azhar after he was released in December 1999 in exchange for 155 hostages onboard the hijacked Air India Flight 814 from Kathmandu to Delhi. Azhar was a member of a 1980's freedom movement group called Harkat ul-Ansaar (movement of the helpers) which rallied support and help for the Afghan militias as well as for the militias in Kashmir. Often

opposed to ISI intervention and support, however has worked with the ISI in the 1980's. Mainly Sunni Muslim group. Currently the group is banned in Pakistan and other areas. Many of its members have gone further underground and various splinter groups have formed.

Its formation on 31 Jan 2000 was endorsed by three religious school chiefs, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai of the Majlis-e-Tawan-e-Islami (MT), Maulana Mufti Rashid Ahmed of the Dar-ul Ifta-e-wal-Irshad and Maulana Sher Ali of the Sheikh-ul-Hadith Dar-ul Haqqania. It enjoys excellent contacts with the Taliban through the Binoria Madrassa in Karachi. JeM was involved in the daring attack on the Indian Parliament on Dec 13, 2001 and is on the U.S. and U.K. list of banned terrorist groups.

HIZB-UL- MUHAHIDEEN (HM) (Group/Party of warriors or those who sacrifice)

Date Founded: September 1989

Principle Area of Operation:

Jammu & Kashmir (bases in Pakistan)

Major Aims:

Original aim: The liberation of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan. Sees Indian army as hostile's therefore viable targets.

However in recent years focus of the party has been shifting towards independence for Kashmir, some elements of the group have started negotiation with the Indian authorities.

Principle Area of Recruitment :

Primarily ethnic Kashmiris. Recruitment may occur at talks and spiritual gatherings in and across Pakistan and Kashmir. Mainly working class and some middle class young idealists.

General Characteristics:

The group originally was the militant wing of Pakistan's largest Islamic political party, the Jamaat-i-Islami (the party of Islam). However disagreements between party officials have over the last 9 years meant that the HM has slowly distanced itself. This has given rise to smaller splinter groups forming and many members of the HM moving towards an independence footing rather than wanting to join Pakistan. It focuses on Indian security forces and politicians in Jammu and Kashmir and has conducted operations jointly with other Kashmiri militants. Has worked with the ISI. Followers are mainly Sunni Muslim.

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) is the largest Kashmiri terrorist organisation, with a cadre base drawn from indigenous and foreign sources, but mostly Kashmiris. The HM came into being as the militant wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), an Islamist organisation. HM opposed Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front's (JKLF) advocacy of an independent Kashmir and wants an integration of Kashmir with Pakistan by the Islamisation of Kashmir. Many of the JKLF cadres either defected to HM or were killed in internecine fighting. The organisation is headed by Mohammed Yusuf Shah, popularly known as Syed Salahuddin, who is also the Chairman of the United Jihad Council (Muttahida Jihad Council) - an organisation of 16 jihadi groups active in Kashmir.

TEHREEK JIHAD-E-ISLAMI, (TEJ) MUSLIM JANBAAZ FORCE and AL-JIHAD FORCE

Nazir Ahmed Wani formed the People's League in September 1974 as a political organisation. But rapidly it gave birth to a welter of terrorist groups. In 1979, its leaders formulated a three-year plan for an uprising against the Indian government. In 1988, its leader Abdul Aziz Sheikh returned to Kashmir from Pakistan, and began organising cadre for armed action. Later that year, however, the League split

with Shabbir Shah and S. Hamid forming the now-defunct Muslim Janbaaz Force, while Sheikh and Moha mmad Farooq Rehmani set up the Tehreek Jihad-e-Islami.

Most of the Tehreek's cadre had joined the Hizbul Mujahideen by 1993, although the mediator in the negotiations between the Hizb and the Union government, Fazl-ul-Haq Qureishi, tried to revive the organisation along with Rehmani in January 1994. The Hizbul Mujahideen's Majid Dar knew Qureishi during his Tehreek days.

Hamid, after years of inactivity, attempted to set up a new organisation, al-Jihad, provoking another split, with Firdaus Ahmed Baba alias Babar Badr setting up a new faction of the Muslim Janbaaz Force. Hamid was killed in an encounter with the security forces. Al-Jihad emerged as the second largest unit in the Kashmir Valley for a while, but had been wiped out by 1994, in part as a result of power struggles within the Hizbul Mujahideen. Qureishi went to jail and emerged years later, alienated from the war he helped begin and is now playing an active role in the restoration of peace.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR LIBERATION FRONT (JKLF)

Date Founded: 1977

Principle Area of Operation:

Originally UK based with bases in Pakistan, Kashmir & Jammu.

Major Aims:

Independent state with no direct links to both India and Pakistan. Through political lobbying and where necessary armed struggle (against India and Pakistan).

Principle Area of Recruitment:

UK & US based nationals, universities, colleges, leadership mainly middle class, upper class elite, followers mainly ethnic Kashmiri.

General Characteristics:

Initially operated from London and Pakistan, actively supporting the nationalist cause of the territory, members have had many disagreements within its ranks which has given rise to different splinter groups forming. Mainly against armed conflict and open to negotiations with India. Therefore it is seen by some of the movements as betraying the area. It is seen as a moderate religious group however links to different militias and different criminal groups.

There are two distinct groups, each of which identifies itself by the name Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Amanullah Khan heads the first while Yasin Malik, who parted ways with Amanullah Khan and formed another JKLF, heads the other. In May 1994, Yasin Malik, who was released from jail (after his arrest in August 1990), declared that his faction would renounce violence as a tool to achieve the goal of 'independence'. In March 1996, the last surviving members of the Amanullah faction, who were based in Jammu and Kashmir, under the leadership of Shabbir Siddiqui were killed in two encounters. The JKLF cadres in Kashmir are part of the democratic political process. But, earlier it was involved in violent attacks and even the brutal killing of Hindus. Some of the JKLF cadres joined HM and some were killed in attacks by the HM or in encounters with the security forces. The JKLF advocates independence of Kashmir unlike HM, which wants integration with Pakistan and Islamisation. JKLF is not a part of the United Jihad Council.

DAWOOD IBRAHIM (D-COMPANY)

Date Founded: 1992 (this date is given as it seems the turning point in Dawood's life)

Principle Area of Operation:

Asian subcontinent.

Major Aims:

No direct aims are portrayed in any literature however some key themes are: Avenge the destruction of Babri Mosque in 1992 and the Gujarat massacres 2002.

Cripple or damage the ability of the Indian government to function or damage particular political parties who are in power – mainly aimed at the Hindu and Sikh nationalists.

Principle Area of Recruitment (General):

Recruits are mainly working class, business associates or taken from poor rural areas.

General Characteristics:

Named after Dawood Ibrahim, a crime boss figure in India, who allegedly became so infuriated at the destruction of the mosque (1992) that he began to use his underworld contacts to instigate a series of campaigns against India. It is seen as one of the main contributors towards funding militias and insurgents in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

D Company is basically a criminal organisation linked to a series of organised criminal and terrorist activities in South Asia, especially in Mumbai and its surroundings. Other prominent members include Tiger Memon, Md. Dosa and Chhota Shakeel. Its members came together to plant bombs in 13 high profile/crowded places in Mumbai on 12 March 1993. 10 exploded, 3 did not. 257 died and 713 were injured in the serial attack. Dawood was at one time the undisputed 'Godfather' of the Mumbai underworld, but is now living somewhere in Pakistan and a red corner notice for his arrest has been issued by Interpol. D-Company also allegedly runs the largest underground business in South Asia. Its operations include arms dealings; drug trafficking, hawala, organized crime and funding of terrorist organizations.

Interviewees also referred to:

MUTTAHIDA QAUMI MOVEMENT

(National movement or united movement of the travelers/ immigrants)

Acronym: MQM **Date Founded:** 1984

Principle Area of Operation:

Grass roots movement in Pakistan.

Major Aims:

Liberalist party with initial support from the large grass roots rural and poor areas of Pakistan. Mainly focused upon providing equal rights and social progression for those who migrated to Pakistan from different parts of India.

Principle Area of Recruitment :

Student movements, initially at universities and colleges.

Leadership mainly middle class, often highly educated individuals.

General Characteristics:

Political party initially set up to ensure equal and social rights. Has been influential in ensuring the replacement of military rule in Pakistan's history. However since 1993 the movement has splintered into different factions all of which still refer to themselves as MQM or MQM official. Some factions have been allegedly linked to criminal gangs and others have been linked to funding various militia groups in Pakistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan. Mainly seen as an anti-religious group, members however have an affiliation to both Shia and Sunni groups.

INTER SERVICES INTELLIGENCE (Pakistan)

Or The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence

Acronym: I.S.I. **Date Founded:** 1948

Principle Area Of Operation:

Major role in covert activity in South East Asia.

Major Aims:

Collection of foreign and domestic intelligence; co-ordination of intelligence functions of the three Pakistani military services.

Provide covert support and help to its military services.

Principle Area of Recruitment (General):

Pakistani Universities, Pakistan elite and 'exceptional' staff from the other military services.

General Characteristics:

Agency is often seen as not being accountable to the Pakistani Government. No real information exists on the exact structure and nature of the organisation. Previously backed by the US and European countries, however since 2004 the Pakistan president under alleged pressure from the US has substantially cut funding and support for the ISI, fuelling arguments that many of its followers have gone underground. The organisation was at the forefront in providing resource to the afghan fighters in the Russian war. Seen by India as a principle backer to most of the jihadist movements, however Seen by India as a principle backer to most of the jihadist movements, however seen by many movements as being antireligious and amoral (particularly JeM, LeT).

Appendix II. EXAMPLES SELECTIONS FROM INTERVIEWS

The following two extracts have been selected to indicate the forms of responses that the interviews provide. The interviews vary in length from approximately one hour to nearly three hours. The resulting transcripts are between 20 and 50 pages long.

In the following transcripts personal initials and key locations have either been changed or made ambiguous in order to conceal the identity of the interviewee. Key details, which may help identify individuals that can be drawn on in future reports when combined to indicate general trends, have also been deleted from the following transcripts.

Extract From Interview with S12 - The ‘Warrior’

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever discuss Kashmir at home?

S12: Usually there were programs on T.V, like Drama, but no direct knowledge.

INTERVIEWER: What did you think about the programs you saw?

S12: My feeling was, what was happening in Kashmir was cruel. Those days there was only PTV. Now after HATIMA new plays are being telecast in episodes lasting three months or more. But, every time there was a Drama telecast on Kashmir that is what we were told- atrocities.

INTERVIEWER: What was your reaction to what you saw?

S12: That there are atrocities and cruelty on Muslim brothers in Kashmir.

INTERVIEWER: Did you discuss the subject at home?

S12: Yes we are originally from Kashmir....When we used to sit around and generally talk. We thought there is too much of atrocities and injustice in Kashmir.

.....

INTERVIEWER: Do you have any hero in Islam?

S12: In Islam I like Prophet Mohammed the most. He was a great Commander of Muslims. He was brave; he was enough for ten, a good Commander and warrior.

.....

INTERVIEWER: Do you know anyone of your village who became a Jihadi? Or have you heard anyone who became a Mujahid in Kashmir ?

S12: No one in childhood.

INTERVIEWER: Did you hear later on?

S12: I haven't visited Kashmir except when I went for bunker training.

INTERVIEWER: What did people think about Mujahids.

S12: At the outset people thought well regarding Jihad. Many times there were media reports praising Jihad till Musharaf came to power.

INTERVIEWER: What did people think about Jihad?

S12: Initially people had good opinion and supported Jihad. That was the situation even when Musharaf came to power. We even celebrated Musharaf coming to power. But now things have changed.

INTERVIEWER: What do you think about the changes?

S12: I don't know what people think of jihad now. Maybe they are not supporting jihad as much. As small children we used to hear about Mujahideens and the praise for them. But, they weren't coming to our village.... But, then they started visiting Mosques to collect donations and to deliver speeches about Jihad.

.....

S12: There is no martyr in our village, but Mujaheeds visiting the village used to talk about other Mujaheeds who achieved martyrdom.

INTERVIEWER: Did all these influence you?

S12: I wasn't much bothered about the world till I met BJ. I used to go to the Mosque, but these issues were not discussed. During the year 2001 and 2002 I started listening to cassettes and then my views started to change.

INTERVIEWER: But, did you think about these before that, maybe with your brother or friends, maybe about Kashmir?

S12: yes, there were general discussions...On TV you see Indian Army capturing people and beating them. Sometimes they telecast dead bodies of people killed by the Army and other atrocities on Kashmiris... Not much in Mosques. But people in the village used to talk regarding this and watch on T.V. ... I listened to audio cassettes and speeches by Maulana Masud Azhar [with my friends] He talked about the atrocities on Muslims. Please understand no Muslim can countenance ill treatment of Muslim women under any circumstances. Fighting such atrocities becomes the duty of every Muslim. I heard these speeches in my village.

.....

We were all the time in search of new cassettes like mad; we were deeply fascinated and inspired. We were all young and we were wandering here and there. [My friends] went for training before me. They were four-five. I did not go and was only preparing for exams. But, ultimately I did not take the exam and ran away.... I was determined to go and fight atrocities against Muslims. I had seen Babri Masjid with bullet marks. I had to fight. There was no alternative.

I did my matriculation in 2001 and during this period met BJ. Mujhahiddin used to frequently visit the area. Everything was public. There were offices with sign boards. BJ belonged to 'Jaish-e-Mohammed'. That is how I started listening to speeches and books of Maulan Masud Azhar. I attended programmes in H. and listened to speeches also there in 2002. Firstly I went to take bunker training and after three weeks our chief visited the area. Once I took training for three weeks. Then I came back.

.....

When, for the first time I went for training I thought that I would come back soon. My mother went to bring me back from there but I could not come with her. I came back later on. My family members asked me not to go there.

After coming back from there in 2002 I started going to college.

INTERVIEWER: can you tell me a bit about activities at the training camp from morning ?

S12: In training camp, early morning we offer prayer; then do exercises after Namaz; then we run in the ground, then we have P.T; then lectures are delivered. Arms training is basically in 7 M.M and T.T pistols; Five rounds. After “ASAR NAMAZ” the training is over .

They deliver lectures about Jihad.

They tell us how operations are conducted.

We are trained how to take aim and fire, how to fire in sitting position. They make us learn how to take aim and fire accurately.

.....

I did not learn making a bomb. But, others did.

.....

We are taught as much as possible in three weeks. Schools are closed for three months till March every year. Many are interested to be trained. So, the training for each group is only for three weeks and we are taught as much possible during the available time.

INTERVIEWER: Then there may be thousands who may have received such training?

S12: Easily in thousands. Each training camp has seven to eight hundred trainees at a time.

INTERVIEWER: Do they receive any remuneration during training?

S12: I took training in school only. My mind was set on fighting after reading literatures and listening to speeches.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have any specific target in mind?

S12: I thought I will go to Kashmir since there are so many atrocities on Muslims there. I wanted to fight for Kashmir freedom.

INTERVIEWER: But, when [your family] heard that you are going for training for Jihad what was their reaction?

S12: They asked me not to go, they tried their best. But, I had made up my mind. After reading and listening about Jihad I did not take their views seriously, thought myself to be smarter, and learned. They tried to tell me that no one was at home and that I should stay at home and study. Make my career. But, I had decided my own future. So, I did not listen to them....I did not tell them anything. Just left home and did whatever I wanted to. I don't think they would have agreed if I had said all that. I actually under-estimated them, thought that they were not clever enough, had not read anything and so were unable to appreciate my decision.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me why didn't your brother similarly join jihad?

S12: He is employed. He was not interested in all these.

INTERVIEWER: So, your brother did not take any training, you took it. You grew up together. But, why did you take a different route in life?

S12: Perhaps, listening to Jihadi speeches made the difference. I became ready to go. [My brother] never heard the speeches he never went there. I was free at home, roaming around without work and so I started meeting these people, going to them. That is how I was more exposed to all these speeches.... I was free in the sense that I had no job. My brother was employed.

.... But after I was exposed to these speeches I did not think about a job. Something had happened to my mind. I wanted to be a Jihadi. I was disturbed and restless. I have put my family members into so

much misery as a result. My brother used to send me different articles and gifts and tell that I should devote my time to studies. He used to advise me to think in terms of going to Australia and England for study. He even provided me a computer to learn how to use it. I was good at studies. But I did not appear in my Examination and dropped out. I thought if I take the exam and get a job I will not be able to do what I wanted to do i.e., fight Jihad.

.....

INTERVIEWER: Did you consider any risks?

S12: Death is in the future. It is a certainty and will come any way. I am not afraid of it. Why should you be afraid of death? Death is there. There is no escape from it. When God wishes only then death will come. If God doesn't wish, nobody can kill me....I will die when the time of death comes. It's pre-ordained. I am not afraid of death. When time comes I will die.

....I was prepared to do anything. But, once in Bangladesh I started thinking what is permissible and not permissible in Islam. When I met RS I was confused, developed doubts. Situations appeared to be quite shady. I saw photographs and T.V. reports on the Mumbai blast while I was still in Bangladesh. Then I started thinking that Islam does not permit killing of innocent. I started thinking, would my parents have liked to see me becoming a part of such death and destruction. I wanted to go to Kashmir to fight the Indian Army. But, they had sent me into India through Bangladesh for carrying out bomb attacks like in Mumbai that would lead to the death of innocent people. By the time I realized it was too late. ... After the Mumbai blast I changed my ideas. But, of course, I knew, there is no way of going back. I did not know where I was being kept. I asked them for my passport which was with them and they were to do my ticket also to return to Pakistan. I was at their mercy and could not have run away in Bangladesh. I was trapped. They must know that Islam does not permit killing of children & women, even it is not permissible to kill Fakirs, women & children when they are innocent. You are not permitted to kill non-combatants in Islam. We will not do such type of acts.

Extracts from Interview with S5 – A ‘Victim’

INTERVIEWER: Please tell me about your childhood....

S5: I belong to a well known Indian Muslim family. All the members of my family are Indians. We were also born here. My grandfather and father died here. I was also born here. I want to die in this country. My family is a middle class family. As regards my childhood, I studied up to class-VII. Because I was suffering from headache during that time, I could not concentrate much on studies. After the seventh standard, I gave up studies. My father said that I should prepare myself for some job. During those days refrigerators and air conditioner were in demand. He said that I should learn how to repair refrigerators and air conditioner. I tried to learn how to repair those. But somebody told me that being a motor mechanic is better than repairing refrigerators and air conditioner. A motor mechanic does not require a shop to work in. A motor mechanic can work even by the road side. I have tried my hands at many things like repairing air conditioner, motor mechanics and motor winding. I worked in a shop in the market. I did business in the shop as a salesman. I got fifty rupees everyday those days. I realized that the atmosphere was not congenial. My friend had a laundry. He asked me to run the laundry. He knew that I belong to a good family. He asked me to look after the laundry. I started running the laundry. My brother, who was in Saudi Arabia, asked me to migrate to that country as a very good company was offering a visa. He assured me of a job in this company. So, I left for Saudi Arabia. For a month or two I stayed there and saw the situation. The country's climate did not suit me. Hence, I said goodbye to Saudi Arabia and returned back home. After landing here, I worked as a salesman in a shop called HP. I worked as a salesman along with my cousin. He later hired a shop on rent. The owner of the shop asked me whether I had any experience in salesmanship. That is the time I got involved in this case, but actually I had no involvement in it. I am in jail for long fourteen years but you can ask anyone about my track record. From my father down to a Sepoy you can ask them about my reputation. I am quite sure that no one will complain against me and nobody has ever found fault with me.

INTERVIEWER: What kinds of charges are levelled against you?

S5: The charge against me is that I carried the scooter to JB and left it there.

INTERVIEWER: Why?

S5: Nothing was known to me. I knew nothing.

INTERVIEWER: Were you involved in any meeting before the incident, etc?

S5: No, no. You will not at all be wrong if you call me an innocent man.

INTERVIEWER: Who was the owner of the scooter?

S5: The scooter belonged to my cousin. He asked me to take the scooter to that place. I knew nothing. There was nothing in my mind. It is not just today. For the last fourteen years people are aware of it. To live inside the jail for fourteen long years is not a joke. I lived in a circle of criminals. During this period of fourteen years, my reputation has remained unchanged so much so that it remained unaffected even when I was pronounced guilty.

INTERVIEWER: Didn't he know what was inside the scooter?

S5: He was aware of it. Only this much he said: “ Brother, you are going to Mumbai. Please take my scooter”.

INTERVIEWER: The bomb was already in the scooter.

S5: I knew nothing. Had my cousin known about this, he would not have stayed at home? No one had tried to escape. All were picked up from home, because they did not know what had happened. I was also at home. Had I known that there was a bomb planted in the scooter I was asked to leave at JB, I would have tried to escape. But, the fact is I did not know. I was oblivious.....

INTERVIEWER: So, you carried the vehicle and abandoned it right in the middle of one of the busiest market. How was the scooter to return? Why did you just abandon it?

S5: I did on his request. I did what he wanted me to do.

I feel happy talking to you. Many truths have come out. I hope you will carry these to the larger society.

I will always pray for your success. I wish that you should get happiness in life. You should always follow the truth.

INTERVIEWER: Thank you.